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A Theory of Differential Punishment
Jack Boeglin*
Zachary Shapiro**
A puzzle has long pervaded the criminal law: why are two
offenders who commit the same criminal act punished differently when
one of them, due to circumstances beyond her control, causes more harm
than the other? This tradition of result-based differential punishment-
the practice of varying offenders' punishment based on whether or not
they cause specific "statutory harms"-has long stood as an intractable
problem for scholars and jurists alike.
This Article proposes a solution to this long-standing conceptual
problem. We begin by introducing a dichotomy between two broad and
exhaustive categories of ideological justifications for punishing criminal
offenders. The first category, offender-facing justifications, includes
many of the most familiar theories of punishment: deterrence,
retribution, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. These offender-facing
theories seek to justify punishment solely on the basis of facts about a
criminal offender, such as her behavior, mental states, and perceived
level of dangerousness. Yet, as we demonstrate, because offender-facing
theories turn exclusively on facts about an offender and her conduct-
rather than on the occurrence of harm outside of the offender's control-
they cannot provide adequate justification for the practice of differential
punishment.
We also identify a second category of justifications for
punishment that, at least in part, conditions the severity of criminal
punishment on the effects that a particular criminal offense has on its
victims. These victim-facing justifications include both "expressive"
theories of punishment, according to which offenders should be punished
out of respect for the victims they have harmed, and vengeance-based
theories of punishment, according to which punishment serves to
recognize and legitimate victims' desire for revenge against their
offenders. Because victim-facing justifications focus on the harm that
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crimes cause to victims, they are, if valid, theoretically capable of
justifying differential punishment.
However, we will show that victim-facing justifications for
punishment are not available for every instance of criminal misconduct.
When a criminal offense (1) has no "object" (in that it is not "done" to
anyone), (2) has a "victim" who either consented to, or was otherwise
culpable for, the commission of the offense, or (3) has a victim who
desires to show "mercy" to the offender, victim-facing theories cannot
justify differential punishment, rendering the practice categorically
unjustifiable in such cases. We conclude by arguing that in these
instances, where differential punishment is unjustified, offenders should
be punished as if they had not brought about the harmful result that
would otherwise subject them to heightened punishment.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2009, three roommates at Purdue University in Indiana were
drinking in their living room on a Saturday night when one of them,
Landon Siela, headed to the bathroom. The other two roommates,
William Calderon and Cory Lynch, each decided to "prank" Siela by
pulling an unloaded gun on him and pretending to shoot when he
returned to the living room. Tragically, Lynch's gun, unbeknownst to
him, still had a live bullet lodged in the chamber, which struck and
killed Siela when Lynch pulled the trigger. As a result, Calderon and
Lynch were both convicted of criminal offenses. But while Calderon was
convicted only of the Class A misdemeanor of "pointing a firearm,"
punishable by no more than a year in prison,' Lynch was convicted of
reckless manslaughter, a Class C felony that carries a maximum
sentence of eight years. 2
It is clear that the fact that Lynch's reckless actions caused
Siela's death exposed him to much harsher legal penalties than those
faced by Calderon. It is less clear, however, what justifies this
discrepancy in severity, given that Lynch does not seem to have
behaved any more culpably than Calderon. This dilemma, a close cousin
of the philosophical problem of "moral luck," has long stood as an
intractable puzzle in the theory of criminal law. 3
The majority position among scholars on this topic, exemplified
by Stephen J. Schulhofer in his influential 1974 article Harm and
Punishment, is that differentiating punishment based on its results
cannot be justified as a matter of practice.4 However, some theorists
have dissented from this view. A few proponents of retributive
punishment, most prominently philosopher Michael Moore,5 have
attempted to resolve the dilemma of "differential punishment" by
1. For an overview of sentencing bands in Indiana for both misdemeanors and felonies, see
Ave Mince-Didier, Indiana Crimes by Class and Sentence, CRIM. DEF. LAW.,
http://www.criminaldefenselawyer.com/resources/criminal-defense/felony-offense/indiana-felony-
class.htm (last visited July 23, 2017) [https://perma.cclLG5V-P7QE].
2. For a news account of this crime, see Jonathan Oskvarek, Two Former Students Receive
Sentences over Summer, EXPONENT (Aug. 20, 2010), http://www.purdueexponent.org/city/
article_7600cafO-645d-54ac-bfb0-b91db03a366d.html [https://perma.cc[KHC9-BZ5B].
3. See generally THOMAS NAGEL, MORAL LUCK (Daniel Statman ed., 1993); BERNARD
wILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK (1982).
4. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of
Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497 (1974); see, e.g., David Enoch & Andrei
Marmor, The Case Against Moral Luck, 26 LAw & PHIL. 405, 414 (2007); Joel Feinberg, Equal
Punishment for Failed Attempts: Some Bad but Instructive Arguments Against It, 37 ARIZ. L. REV.
117 (1995); Sanford H. Kadish, The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 SUP. CT. REV. 679
(1994).
5. MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 225 (2010).
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claiming that the consequences of one's actions weigh directly on one's
"moral desert," and thus that an action that causes greater harm merits
greater punishment.6 Other commentators, such as Judge Richard
Posner, have advanced utilitarian rationales for more severely
punishing those offenders who cause greater harm, arguing, inter alia,
that this approach more effectively and efficiently deters future
harmful conduct.7 However, as of yet, no theorist has succeeded in
producing a widely accepted justification for this feature of the criminal
law.
In this Article, we propose a general theory of differential
punishment-that is, the practice of differentiating an offender's
punishment based on whether her actions bring about a statutory
harm. In so defining differential punishment, we borrow Schulhofer's
definition of statutory harm as "[a]ny consequence of conduct . .. [that]
is a necessary element of a given offense."8 As Schulhofer explains, the
concept of statutory harm is not coextensive with what might ordinarily
be thought of as the "harms" caused by a criminal offense, or with the
ultimate harm or consequence that the criminal offense seeks to
prevent. 9 For example, if a married man is murdered, his wife might be
"harmed" in that she mourns his death and misses his company. But
the wife's psychological distress is not a statutory harm for the crime of
murder, because-unlike her husband's death-it is not a necessary
element of the crime. Conversely, because the crime of burglary
requires "unauthorized entry into a building with intent to commit a
felony therein," one might reasonably think that the intended felony,
and not the unlawful entry, is the ultimate harm the crime of burglary
seeks to prevent. 10 However, because "unauthorized entry into a
building" is a consequence of the offender's conduct that is a necessary
element of the crime of burglary, it is a statutory harm. Moreover, it is
important to note that not all crimes have a statutory harm-for
instance, inchoate crimes, such as attempts, prohibit certain types of
conduct even if such conduct does not lead to any statutorily prohibited
consequences.
While a myriad of factors go into determining what specific
sentence a judge will impose in any given case (such as an offender's
"acceptance of responsibility" and past criminal history), differential
punishment refers specifically to the practice of classifying offenders
6. See infra Section I.B.
7. See infra Section I.A.
8. Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 1505.
9. Id.
10. Schulhofer provides a discussion of this example himself. Id. at 1506.
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who cause particular statutory harms as guilty of offenses that carry
higher penalties than those crimes applicable to offenders who engage
in equally culpable behavior, yet for whatever reason do not bring about
statutory harms.
In the pages below, we propose a novel theory of differential
punishment that introduces a distinction between two broad and
exhaustive categories of theoretical justifications for criminal
punishment. On the one hand, what we will refer to as offender-facing
justifications condition punishment on various facts about an offender,
including her actions, mental states, and risk of dangerousness to
herself and to others. Offender-facing justifications for punishment
include many of the best-known theories of punishment, such as
deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. As we will
demonstrate, because offender-facing justifications focus exclusively on
facts about an offender and her actions, they are not capable of
justifying differential punishment based on results outside of the
offender's control.
On the other hand, victim-facing justifications condition
punishment on the effects that criminal offenses have on their victims.
These justifications are premised on the notion that the state should
take the interests of victims into account when determining how
severely criminal offenders should be punished. Victim-facing
justifications tend either to take the form of certain "expressive"
theories of punishment, according to which offenders should be
punished out of respect to victims for the harm that they have
suffered," or vengeance-based theories, which recognize victims' desire
for revenge against their offenders. As we will show, because victim-
facing justifications focus on the actual consequences of criminal
conduct, rather than merely on offenders' culpable behavior, they are,
if valid, capable of justifying the practice of differential punishment in
many circumstances.
Therefore, to the extent that differential punishment can be
justified at all, it can only be justified in reference to these victim-facing
justifications. Yet, as we will demonstrate, victim-facing justifications
for punishment are not applicable to all criminal offenses or instances
of criminal misconduct. In cases where (1) a criminal offense has no
"object" (in that it is not "done" to anyone), where (2) the victim of a
crime consented to or was otherwise culpable for the commission of the
criminal offense, or where (3) a victim disavows expressive or
11. As we will discuss in greater detail later on, not all expressive theories of punishment are
victim-facing-some expressive theories support a regime of punishment coextensive with an
offender's culpability, and are thus entirely offender-facing. See infra Sections IB, II.A.
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vengeance-based punishment on his behalf, victim-facing justifications
cease to function as legitimate justifications for differential
punishment.
Our framework will demonstrate that, no matter which of the
currently recognized theories of criminal punishment one thinks are
legitimate, it follows that differential punishment will never be
warranted in those three types of cases. Because previous authors have
focused solely on the question of whether differential punishment can
be justified writ large, they have failed to reckon with the possibility
that the practice may be justified with respect to some types of offenses,
but not to others. By distinguishing between offender-facing and victim-
facing justifications for punishment, this Article provides a layer of
nuance to the debate over differential punishment, and identifies for
the first time three categories of offenses in regard to which all parties
should agree differential punishment should not extend.
In those circumstances where differential punishment is
unwarranted, an offender should only be punished for culpable behavior
within her control, and not for any statutory harm resulting from her
actions. Our general proposal is accordingly to punish offenders of
completed crimes for which victim-facing justifications for punishment
do not apply as if the statutory harm had not occurred. Under this
framework, completed intentional crimes for which victim-facing
justifications do not apply should be punished only as severely as are
attempts of those same crimes. 12 In jurisdictions where attempts and
completed crimes are already punished equally, our recommendation
would therefore not have any effect on how such offenders are punished.
But our proposal would have far more dramatic implications
with regard to the punishment of non-intentional offenses, as
abandoning a regime of differential punishment would almost always
lead to a significant reduction in punishment for offenders of non-
intentional crimes. This is because non-intentional criminal conduct is
generally not punished harshly unless it brings about a statutory harm.
Indeed, in the absence of statutory harm, such behavior is generally
only punished at all when it is independently criminalized (as with the
crime of driving under the influence) or when it risks inflicting serious
injury or bodily harm to another (as with the crime of reckless
endangerment).
In Parts I and II, we introduce the dichotomy between offender-
facing and victim-facing justifications for punishment, and show that
only the latter category is capable of justifying differential punishment.
12. Importantly, we are not recommending that such offenders be charged with (or convicted
of) attempted crimes. Rather, we are suggesting that these crimes merely be punished as such.
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In doing so, our Article presents the most comprehensive and up-to-date
discussion in the academic literature of why many of the traditional
theories of criminal punishment cannot justify the practice of
differential punishment. In Part III, we venture into untrodden
territory, identifying three distinct categories of criminal offenses to
which victim-facing justifications for punishment cannot apply, even in
principle. We conclude that, due to the unavailability of victim-facing
justifications, differential punishment is never warranted in such cases.
In Part IV, we demonstrate how our conclusions in Part III
should be applied both to intentional and non-intentional criminal
offenses to which victim-facing justifications do not apply, and we
suggest that such completed offenses should be punished as if the
statutory harm had not occurred. Putting our recommendations into
practice would greatly reduce the sentences for a significant class of
criminal offenders at both the state and federal levels, cutting down on
the chronic problem of over-incarceration that haunts our penal system
without undermining the objectives of any of the recognized
justifications for criminal punishment.
I. OFFENDER-FACING JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PUNISHMENT
Many of the classic justifications for criminal punishment-
deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation, and incapacitation-do not
depend on the occurrence of a statutory harm. These offender-facing
justifications relate to various facts about an offender: his actions,
mental states, level of dangerousness, etc. Thus, these justifications
remain valid even in the case of inchoate crimes, such as attempts,
where the offender has not caused any statutory harm. As we will argue
in this Part, offender-facing justifications cannot justify differential
punishment, precisely because they depend solely on facts about the
offender and his behavior, rather than on the consequences of his
actions.
Although we are the first to group these justifications for
punishment together and label them "offender-facing," we are not the
first to suggest that many of the classic theories of criminal punishment
cannot justify the role that the results of an offender's conduct currently
play in American criminal law. Other commentators, most notably
Schulhofer in his 1974 paper, have made the case that whether or not
an offender's actions lead to a statutory harm is irrelevant to many of
the justifications for criminal punishment.1 3 However, a minority of
scholars have pushed back against this view in recent decades.
13. Schulhofer, supra note 4.
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Therefore, we think that it is important to discuss each of these
justifications in turn, in order to address any objections and to
affirmatively make the case that offender-facing justifications do not,
and cannot, justify differential punishment.
A. Deterrence
Perhaps the most widely accepted justification for punishing
criminal offenders is the deterrence of future crime. 14 While the law has
other means of deterring undesirable conduct, such as civil fines and
penalties, recourse to criminal punitive measures is usually seen as
necessary to prevent the serious misconduct that the criminal law
concerns itself with.15 However, the question remains: Does
differentiating punishment based on whether a given course of criminal
conduct leads to a harmful result deter more crime than would
punishing all instances of such conduct equally? We submit that it does
not.
By punishing criminal offenders, the state can simultaneously
accomplish two forms of deterrence.16 First, punishing an offender
disincentivizes the general population from engaging in criminal action
by demonstrating the negative consequences of doing so; this is known
as general deterrence. Second, punishing an offender incentivizes that
offender to himself abstain from future criminal action; this is known
as specific deterrence. For two reasons, we will take the word
"deterrence" to mean "general deterrence" for the remainder of this
section. First, nearly all arguments made in favor of differential
punishment focus on the effects it has on general deterrence.17 Second,
14. While the general public and the vast majority of commentators accept deterrence as a
legitimate aim of the criminal justice system, there are serious academic criticisms of deterrence
and of utilitarian justifications for punishing offenders writ large. See, e.g., Erik Luna, Punishment
Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 214-
15:
The strongest criticisms of utilitarian punishment, however, implicate the Kantian
categorical imperative to never use individuals as means to other ends but to treat them
as ends in and of themselves. . . . There is no necessary correlation between crime and
sanction under utilitarian theory, only between sanction and increased social utility.
15. This insight plays an important role in the economic analysis of criminal law. See, e.g.,
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089, 1126 (1972) ("In other words, we impose criminal
sanctions as a means of deterring future attempts to convert property rules into liability rules.").
16. See generally ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, SENTENCING RATIONALES, LAW OF SENTENCING
§ 2:2 (2015).
17. One minor exception is Bentham's suggestion of "characteristicalness"-that, when
possible, an offender's punishment will have more deterrent effect if it resembles the harm the
offender inflicted. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 182-83 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1789). Because
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most empirical studies conclude that lengthening an offender's sentence
generally has a neutral or even positive effect on his likelihood of
recidivism 18-consequently, we can conclude at the outset that it would
be categorically unwise to base substantial differences in punishment
on the theory of specific deterrence.
While the majority of commentators believe, as we do, that
result-based punishment in the criminal law does not advance the goal
of deterrence, 19 a minority of scholars contest this issue. Within the
academic literature, these deterrence-based arguments for differential
punishment usually take one of four standard forms. We will address
(and ultimately reject) each of these in turn.
The first argument commonly cited in favor of differential
punishment is known as the "penal lottery."20 This view posits that,
given that people are generally risk averse, 21 arbitrarily punishing
certain offenders severely and others leniently will deter crime more
effectively and efficiently than would punishing all offenders equally. If
true, this proposition would lead to the conclusion that varying
punishment based on results would, in fact, lead to greater deterrence
than would punishing the underlying action consistently.
This theory rests upon a testable empirical proposition-
namely, that the prospect of severe punishment, even if uncertain,
deters more effectively than less severe, but certain, punishment does.
As it turns out, however, the sizable literature investigating this
question consistently finds certainty in punishment to be far more
this argument's empirical basis has not been tested, because other scholars have not pursued the
concept, and because this argument has more to do with the character rather than length of
punishment, we will not discuss it further here.
18. For a summary of the empirical literature on this point, see Lin Song & Roxanne Lieb,
Recidivism: The Effect of Incarceration and Length ofTime Served, WASH. ST. INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y
5-6 (1993), http://pgn-stage.wsipp.wa.govReportFile/1 152/WsippRecidivism-The-Effect-of-
Incarceration-and-Length-of-Time-Served-Full-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/BVC5-NZKD].
19. See, e.g., id.; H.L.A. Hart, Intention and Punishment, 4 OXFORD REV. 5 (1967), reprinted
in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 113, 130 (2d ed. 2008) ("[T]here seems no reason on any form
of deterrent theory .. . for punishing the unsuccessful attempt less severely than the completed
crime."); Schulhofer, supra note 4. In an article rejecting all four of the arguments discussed here,
Marcelo Ferrante raises some novel claims about the deterrent force differential punishment could
incidentally serve assuming a number of sociological conditions and cognitive biases. Marcelo
Ferrante, Deterrence and Crime Results, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2007). While interesting, these
arguments rely on sociological and psychological claims that have yet to be established, and so do
not warrant greater discussion here. Moreover, due to their recentness, Ferrante's arguments
cannot possibly be what currently motivates differential punishment.
20. See, e.g., Vincent Chiao, Ex Ante Fairness in Criminal Law and Procedure, 15 NEW CRIM.
L. REV. 277, 279 (2012).
21. Doron Teichman, The Optimism Bias of the Behavioral Analysis of Crime Control, 2011
U. ILL. L. REV. 1697, 1700.
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important than severity in deterring undesirable action.22 Pending new
and contradictory evidence, therefore, the empirical proposition upon
which this argument is founded appears false.
A second well-known argument for differential punishment is
that it provides marginal incentives for offenders to abandon their
criminal design before the criminal act is consummated, whereas equal
punishment removes incentives for abandonment of criminal plans. 23
As Judge Richard Posner puts it:
If the punishment for attempted murder were the same as for murder, one who shot and
missed (and was not caught immediately) might as well try again, for if he succeeds, he
will be punished no more severely than for his unsuccessful attempt.2 4
Like the "penal lottery" argument, this argument also fails to
justify the role that results play in the criminal law. First, these alleged
marginal incentives are largely irrelevant in instances of non-
intentional criminal conduct, where the offender generally does not
desire the proscribed result to occur in the first place. Moreover, even
in the case of intentional crimes, this argument does little to explain
why a gunman who tried to murder someone would give up simply
because he missed once. Presumably, the gunman in Posner's example
intended to murder his victim despite the criminal consequences of
doing so; in other words, it was "worth it" for him to kill, even in light
of the increased criminal sanctions for the completed offense of
murder. 2 5 While surely some of the individuals who attempt criminal
offenses have a "change of heart" after failing the first time, Posner's
theory would only apply to the, likely rare, individual who had a half-
hearted change of mind (i.e., who would not attempt the offense again
if there were a difference in punishment between an attempt and the
completed crime, but would attempt it again if the punishment for the
two crimes was the same).
22. See, e.g., Guyora Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965,
982 (2008) ("Empirical investigations indicate that increases in the certainty of punishment are
more effective deterrents than increases in the severity of punishment."); Daniel S. Nagin,
Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & JUST. 199, 201 (2013) (finding that "evidence
in support of the deterrent effect of various measures of the certainty of punishment is far more
convincing and consistent than for the severity of punishment"). But see Tom Baker et al., The
Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 443 (2004) (suggesting
that in certain circumstances, including the public's general aversion to risk, uncertain penalties
may lead to greater deterrence).
23. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193
(1985); Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 1519.
24. Posner, supra note 23, at 1218.
25. In very limited circumstances, differential punishment could serve to deter an offender
who attempted an offense but then had a "change in calculus" (such that they would rather accept
the lower punishment that comes with an attempt than the higher punishment for the completed
offense). However, such undoubtedly rare scenarios clearly cannot justify our regime of differential
punishment writ large.
1508 [Vol. 70:5:1499
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A more fundamental flaw in this argument, however, is that it
overlooks the powerful incentives that an offender has to desist from a
criminal course of action even under a regime of equal punishment. 26
To begin with, many jurisdictions offer complete or partial defenses to
those who abandon criminal conduct that would otherwise constitute
an attempt before the crime is completed. 27 Furthermore, continuing a
criminal course of action increases an offender's chances of being
apprehended, as it is far more likely culpable behavior will be uncovered
and investigated if it leads to real-world harm than if it is abandoned
before any such harm has occurred. Finally, even if the criminal law did
not mete out more punishment when an offender's actions bring about
a statutory harm, such harms often render offenders liable for civil
damages. These non-criminal incentives to desist from criminal conduct
are more than adequate at providing marginal deterrence, even in the
absence of differential punishment.
A third deterrence-based justification for differential
punishment, offered by Jerome Michael and Herbert Wechsler in their
1937 paper A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, holds that differential
punishment provides substantially the same deterrent value as would
punishing all instances of the underlying conduct, and comes at a lower
practical cost than punishing attempts equally as completed offenses. 28
The core assumption of this argument is that an individual
contemplating a criminal act looks to the penalty for the completed, as
opposed to the attempted, crime when deciding whether to act. That is,
offenders are significantly and systematically over optimistic; they are
so certain they will be successful that they look only to the penalty for
the completed crime when deciding whether to try to commit an offense.
However, as with the previous "marginal incentives"
justification, this argument is subject to the immediate and obvious
shortcoming that it only applies to intentional crimes. It assumes
offenders are optimistic, which would imply that non-intentional
26. See Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 1520 (arguing that continuing a criminal course of action
increases the chances of apprehension and the probability of facing liability at tort law, and
prevents an offender from receiving the complete defense to an attempt that results from
abandonment of a criminal scheme).
27. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(3) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
However, this defense is only available in a limited number of circumstances. Id. § 5.01(4):
[R]enunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary if it is motivated, in whole or in
part, by circumstances, not present or apparent at the inception of the actor's course of
conduct, that increase the probability of detection or apprehension or that make more
difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose.
Cf. Evan Tsen Lee, Cancelling Crime, 30 CONN. L. REV. 117, 122 n.18 (1997) (suggesting an
interpretation of the MPC for which Posner's attempter would not be able to renounce his attempt).
28. Jerome Michael & Herbert Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide II, 37 COLUM.
L. REV. 1261, 1295 (1937).
1509
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
offenders envision that they will not cause any harm, and would thus
look primarily to the penalty for the result-less crime when deciding
whether to engage in culpable behavior. Furthermore, even in the case
of intentional crimes, there is scant empirical support that "optimism
bias" applies to those contemplating criminal actions, 29 and it would be
irrational to suggest that the punishment of attempts never deters
prospective offenders. To wit, if attempts were not punished at all, a
man considering committing a crime, such as murder, could rest
assured that either he would succeed in murdering his target or get off
scot-free for the attempt. At most, then, this theory suggests that the
criminal justice system can substantially deter intentional crimes
without punishing attempts as severely as it does completed offenses. 0
A fourth and final deterrence-based argument in favor of
differential punishment is that juries would refuse to convict offenders
who did not cause harm if they were to be sentenced as harshly as are
those who did. This argument was contemplated in the commentary to
the fourth draft of the Model Penal Code ("MPC"), which stated:
[J]uries will not lightly find convictions that will lead to the severest types of sentences
unless the resentments caused by the infliction of important injuries have been aroused.
Whatever abstract logic may suggest, a prudent legislator cannot disregard these facts of
life in the enactment of a penal code.3 1
However, this argument, too, quickly falls apart under closer
scrutiny. As a general matter, the only inchoate crimes for which the
"severest types of sentences" are currently imposed are attempts. 32 Yet,
at present, such offenses are punished nearly as harshly (and in some
jurisdictions, just as harshly) as are completed crimes,33 apparently
without fear of widespread jury nullification. In contrast, the "baseline"
punishment for reckless and negligent behavior in a system of equal
punishment would likely not be so severe as to provoke fears of jury
nullification. For example, it is extremely unlikely under a regime of
equal punishment that a legislature would determine that all drunk
29. See Teichman, supra note 21, at 1700. The bias was famously documented in Neil D.
Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
806 (1980).
30. To be clear, in a world of limited law enforcement resources, this might justify more
frequently prosecuting cases in which harm actually occurs, both because there is better evidence
of their commission and because punishing them will have a stronger signaling effect. But this
does not explain why one would give offenders who do not cause harm less punishment if criminal
charges against them are actually being pursued.
31. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 cmt. at 134 (AM. LAW. INST., Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955).
32. For instance, attempted murder is typically punished far more severely than is reckless
endangerment.
33. In states that follow the MPC, attempts are punished equally with completed crimes.
There is an exception to this proposition in the case of the death penalty, which, when available at
all, is only applicable in the case of murders and not attempted murders.
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drivers should be punished as severely as those convicted of vehicular
homicide currently are.3 4 Of course, such a regime might prove
unsatisfactory to certain jury members-because they would think it
too lenient on offenders that actually cause harm. But juries cannot
exercise their power of nullification to increase a sentence, and thus the
MPC's concern would be inapplicable. 35
Furthermore, while the frequency with which jury nullification
occurs is notoriously difficult to calculate, the best estimates are that
nullification occurs in only about four percent of criminal cases, 36 and
less than ten percent of criminal cases come in front of a jury in the first
place. 37 Thus, even if juries were marginally more likely to nullify under
a regime of equal punishment (which we think is unlikely), resting the
justification for differential punishment on the fear of nullification
would be a severe overreaction.
Taken either together or separately, none of these four
deterrence-based arguments in favor of differential punishment is
ultimately persuasive. Moreover, even if the reader finds some merit in
any of these arguments, they still fall far short of justifying the
enormous role that results currently play in determining criminal
punishments. Critically, nearly all of the deterrence-based arguments
for differential punishment are addressed toward intentional offenses.
But, as we have already explained, the existence of statutory harm
generally has only a minimal impact on the sentencing of intentional
crimes, whereas it can profoundly affect the level of punishment a non-
intentional offender receives. Especially given the fact that offenders
are seldom familiar with the sentence a given offense carries, 38 and that
34. While a risk must be "substantial and unjustifiable" to qualify as criminally negligent or
reckless, it certainly does not have to be more probable than not as a general matter. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.02(2) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). Therefore, most people who act
recklessly do not bring about harm. Thus, under a regime of equal punishment, the uniform
sentence accompanying offending conduct would presumably be closer to the current level for the
resultless crime than to the completed crime.
35. In fact, juries are not always made aware of the sentence that will flow from conviction
before returning their verdicts. See Jeffrey Bellin, Is Punishment Relevant After All? A Prescription
for Informing Juries of the Consequences of Conviction, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2223 (2010); Michael T.
Cahill, Punishment Decisions at Conviction: Recognizing the Jury as Fault-Finder, 2005 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 91.
36. Aaron McKnight, Jury Nullification as a Tool to Balance the Demands of Law and Justice,
2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1103, 1109 ("[S]cholars estimate that jury nullification happens in about 4%
of cases.").
37. See Criminal Trials, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/types-
cases/criminal-cases (last visited July 23, 2017) [https://perma.cclLV8F-259V] ("More than 90
percent of defendants plead guilty rather than go to trial.").
38. For an excellent discussion of the implications of offenders' general lack of knowledge
about what is and is not criminalized, as well as of how severely crimes are punished, see Paul H.
Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science Investigation, 24
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (2004).
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increasing the severity of punishment beyond a relatively low threshold
has limited marginal deterrence value, 39 it seems clear that deterrence
provides little support for the proposition that differential punishment
is either justified or desirable.
B. Retribution
Another commonly cited justification for punishment is
retribution-the "application of deontological ethics to criminal
justice."40 Retributivism relies on the basic premise that criminal
offenders should be made to suffer, in the form of criminal punishment,
in "payment" for their crimes. 41 Through administering retributive
punishment, the criminal justice system also expresses society's moral
condemnation of the offender. Thus, in accordance with a retributive
theory of justice, criminal punishment should be coextensive with (or at
least constrained by) a criminal's moral desert. In order for
retributivism to justify differential punishment, therefore, an offender
must be more culpable when his actions bring about statutory harm
than if he had engaged in the same behavior, and yet the statutory
harm had not occurred. As we will argue, this is not the case.
While the basic intuition that punishment serves as "payment"
for crime is both "ancient and widely-held," 42 retributivism has its
clearest roots in the work of eighteenth-century philosopher Immanuel
Kant. In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argued that criminal
punishment "can never be inflicted merely as a means to promote some
other good for the criminal himself or for civil society. It must be
inflicted upon him only because he has committed a crime ... in
proportion to his inner wickedness."43
Following in the Kantian tradition, modern day proponents of
retributive justice see the act of punishment as a normative obligation:
39. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 4-5 (2014), http://www.nap.edulcatalog/18613/the-
growth-of-incarceration-in-the-united-states-exploring-causes# [https:/perma.cc/B96L-UT7W]
(finding that increasing already substantial sentences has little to no general deterrence effect).
Of course, simply keeping offenders in prison longer achieves some deterrence by incapacitating
dangerous individuals, as discussed infra Section I.C.
40. Guyora Binder, Victims and the Significance of Causing Harm, 28 PACE L. REV. 713, 715
(2008).
41. See, e.g., John Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, in RETRIBUTION 3, 3 (Thom Brooks
ed., 2014).
42. Id.
43. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 105-06 (Mary Gregor ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1996) (1797).
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"[w]e do injustice if we fail to punish criminals, because they then do
not receive what they deserve."44
Even if one does not accept the Kantian rationale for
retributivism, it is possible to justify retributive punishment on
expressive grounds. According to proponents of the expressivist view, a
central purpose of criminal punishment is for the state to
authoritatively express society's moral condemnation of criminal
behavior. 45 Thus, in the words of Dan Kahan, "[t]he proper retributive
punishment is the one that appropriately expresses condemnation and
reaffirms the values that the wrongdoer denies." 46 Expressive theories,
therefore, can provide a positive rationale for retributive punishment
coextensive with an offender's moral culpability, but do not require the
conclusion that retributivism is an inherent moral imperative. 47
Ordinarily, we deem an agent morally culpable only for those
actions of hers that are under her control.48 Accordingly, the feature of
criminal action that renders it subject to judgments of culpability in the
first place is that the criminal chose to act in such a way.4 9 Consider the
criminal doctrines of the "act requirement" and the "insanity" and
"duress" defenses:50 these doctrines codify the principle that only
sufficiently agential actions are properly subject to moral and legal
censure. When we punish criminal offenders differently based on the
results of their actions,5 1 therefore, we seem to violate this deeply held
moral conviction that "ought implies can," and thus that culpability
should not be based on something outside of an actor's control.
Why, then, in the words of H.L.A. Hart, "should the accidental
fact that . .. [a] harmful outcome has not occurred be a ground for
punishing less a criminal who may be equally dangerous and equally
44. Thom Brooks, Retributivism, in RETRIBUTION, supra note 41, at 83, 85.
45. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF
RESPONSIBILITY 95-118 (1970); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 2021, 2026 (1996).
46. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 602 (1996).
47. As we will discuss in Part II, there are expressive theories that are not coextensive with
offenders' culpability and thus may be able to justify differential punishment. See, e.g., JEAN
HAMPTON, THE INTRINSIC WORTH OF PERSONS 108-51 (2007).
48. This sentiment was expressed by Kant, who wrote that "[t]he good will is not good because
of what it effects or accomplishes . . . it is good only because of its willing." IMMANUEL KANT,
FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS § 1 para. 3 (Lewis White Beck trans., Library of
Liberal Arts 2d ed. 1989) (1785).
49. Sanford H. Kadish, Foreword: The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679, 688 (1994).
50. For a cogent discussion of these doctrines and the role of voluntariness in the criminal
law, see generally Ian P. Farrell & Justin F. Marceau, Taking Voluntariness Seriously, 54 B.C. L.
REV. 1545 (2013).
51. See Binder, supra note 40, at 716 ("Once the actor has culpably imposed a risk, the
wrongful and culpable act is complete. The results of his act are often out of his hands.").
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wicked?" 52 This quandary is known as the "problem of moral luck"53 and
has led most philosophers and legal theorists to the conclusion that
retributivism cannot justify differential punishment. 54
However, a small minority of theorists has attempted to "solve"
the problem of moral luck by insisting that criminal offenders are, in
fact, more culpable in cases where their actions bring about harmful
results. Four types of justifications are generally given for such a view.
First, some theorists appeal to an allegedly widely held intuition
that "more punishment is deserved in cases where . .. [harm results]
than in cases where it does not."5 5 The most prominent formulation of
this argument comes from philosopher Michael Moore. In his book
Placing Blame, Moore builds an argument for differential punishment
out of three claims about people's attitudes with regard to causing
harm: (1) most people believe that an offender "deserves more
punishment for having killed [a victim] than he would if he had
unsuccessfully tried to kill [that victim]"; (2) most people experience a
"feeling of greater guilt . . . when they succeed in causing (versus trying
for or risking) bad results"; 56 and (3) most people tend to focus on the
possible results of a course of action, rather than saying to themselves,
"[i]t does not matter how my choice comes out, so long as I make a
reasonable choice without any culpable intention."57 Moore goes on to
argue that "[t]he principle whose truth best explains this mass of
judgments in particular cases is of course the principle that [causing a
harmful result] independently determines the extent of our just deserts,
along with culpability."58
52. HART, supra note 19, at 131.
53. Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 24, 26 (Canto ed. 1991) ("Where a
significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to
treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck.").
54. Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 931, 935 (2000) ("[A]ttempts and successes should be regarded not only as equally
culpable, but also as equally blameworthy and punishable .... ); Kimberly D. Kessler, The Role
of Luck in the Criminal Law, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 2183, 2192 (1994) ("Capable of acting on our own
beliefs and desires, we expect to be held criminally responsible only for our decisions to disobey
the law and not for the workings of fate."); Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal
Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 383 ("Results should not matter to desert, because good
reason in general and legal rules in particular can fully and directly influence only intentional
action. Results are properly objects of celebration and regret, but only actions should be objects of
moral praise and blame."); Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 1514 (arguing that punishment of criminal
harm based on retributivism is "anti-rational").
55. MOORE, supra note 5, at 225.
56. Id. at 230 (emphasis added). This argument is known as the "remorse analogy." See, e.g.,
R.A. DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY, AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY 189-90 (1990).
57. MOORE, supra note 5, at 229-32.
58. Id. at 226.
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However, this argument from "intuition" fails to adequately
address the problem of moral luck. First, the "intuitive judgment"
represented in (1) "cannot claim anything approaching widespread
appeal."59 Suppose, for example, that Albert and Ben each shoot at their
bosses, intending to kill.60 Holding all else constant, it does not
intuitively seem that it should matter in assessing Albert's and Ben's
comparative moral culpability if Albert's bullet hit his boss dead-on and
Ben's bullet only grazed his boss's arm, or if Albert's boss miraculously
recovered in the hospital from her head wound, while Ben's boss
unexpectedly succumbed to a fatal arm infection. Furthermore, though
some empirical studies indicate that many people do support greater
punishment for those offenders that bring about harmful results, these
people by and large do not believe those offenders to have done
something more wrongful.6 1 To the extent that this intuition does in fact
exist, then, the justification for it appears to be non-retributive in
nature.62
Second, the jump from "self-regarding" to "other-regarding"
judgments in propositions (2) and (3) is equally problematic. The guilt
we feel when we cause harm to others may have little to do with the
self-ascription of culpability, but instead be an expression of empathy
towards our victims. 6 3 For example, if I am driving down the road at a
reasonable speed while exercising reasonable diligence, I may
nevertheless feel "guilty" if a child unexpectedly jumps in front of my
car and is hurt, even if I (correctly) judge that I have not done anything
"wrong."64 Similarly, the fact that we prospectively focus on the risk of
harm occurring when making decisions about how to act does not give
us any reason to think that whether harm results is an appropriate
basis for punishing others. While it may very well be appropriate to
condition moral and legal culpability on criminal offenders' prospective
59. Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 1515.
60. Id.
61. See Fiery Cushman, Crime and Punishment: Distinguishing the Roles of Causal and
Intentional Analyses in Moral Judgment, 108 COGNITION 353, 375-78 (2008).
62. As we explain in Section IIA, this judgment might be an expression of sympathy for the
victim rather than an additional condemnation of the offender.
63. We will discuss empathy towards victims infra Section II.A. See also Binder, supra note
40, at 732:
[T1o the extent we are more disappointed in ourselves when we cause harm rather than
imposing unjustifiable risk, it is largely because of our decreased ability to delude
ourselves into minimizing the risk we carelessly imposed. But insofar as our relative
complacency about our own harmless wrongdoing results from self-serving self-
deception, it has no moral weight and provides no justification for punishing harmless
wrongdoers less than harmful ones.
64. See Herbert Morris, Nonmoral Guilt, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS
220 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987).
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assessment of the probability that their conduct will bring about harm,
it is an altogether different thing to say that we should condition
culpability on the actual occurrence of those harms. Taken together, the
"intuitive judgments" of (1)-(3), regardless of whether they are widely
held, fall short of justifying the inclusion of moral luck into a theory of
retribution.
A second line of argument, advanced by Moore in Placing Blame,
appeals to the problem of determinism. This argument begins with the
premise that "if luck is inconsistent with desert, it is a problem that
applies far more broadly than to results alone."65 That is to say, if we
are not culpable for the results of our actions because they are
physically determined (and therefore beyond our control), nor too
should we be held culpable for: (1) our ability to "[e]ffectuate [our]
[c]hoices, [i]ntentions, and [p]lans" through action 6 6-insofar as our
somatic system dictates our bodily movements; (2) our capacity to make
choices about how to act67-insofar as these are determined by the
neural correlates of thought; or (3) our "character" that leads us to act
harmfully in the first place 68-insofar as this, too, is determined by our
neurochemistry. According to this line of thought, "the concept of moral
luck may seem to imply that any criterion for desert will be a matter of
luck and moral and legal responsibility will be obliterated."69 Thus,
claims Moore, in order to avoid the "trap" of moral skepticism, we must
abandon the idea that causal determinism is incompatible with
legitimate attributions of culpability and accept a normative function
for moral luck in our theory of retributive justice.70
This argument also fails to circumvent the problem of moral
luck. As Stephen Morse and others have pointed out, the system of
criminal law must necessarily presuppose a "compatibilist"71 view with
regard to free action.72 According to the compatibilist view, what makes
an action "free" (and thus subject to moral and criminal judgment) is
65. Morse, supra note 54, at 380 (citing MOORE, supra note 5, at 233-46).
66. MOORE, supra note 5, at 234 (emphasis removed).
67. Id. at 239.
68. Id. at 243.
69. Morse, supra note 54, at 381.
70. See MOORE, supra note 5, at 246.
71. For a well-known account of compatibilism, see DANIEL C. DENNE'I', BRAINSTORMS:
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON MIND AND PSYCHOLOGY (1978).
72. Morse, supra note 54, at 383:
The criminal law operates within the realm of practical reason. Within that realm, only
the compatibilist view provides a potentially satisfactory answer to how action can be
distinguished from endowment, opportunity, and results; and thus makes sense of the
intuition that luck-commonly understood as determined events that are morally
arbitrary-should not matter to desert.
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not that the actor possesses some sort of godlike "libertarian" free will
outside of the laws of physics, but rather that the actor has "the capacity
to grasp and be guided by reason."73 Compatibilism allows us to
separate those actions that give rise to criminal culpability (such as
murdering one's husband for the reason that he is having an affair) from
those that do not (such as killing one's husband in the course of having
an involuntary seizure or some other non-reason-based "automatistic"
behavior 74), even if both types of actions are ultimately "determined" by
the laws of physics. Therefore, since "reasons can guide only the action
and not the ultimate outcome," 75 free action is properly subject to moral
scrutiny and ascriptions of culpability, while results are not.
Some theorists have also tried to justify the inclusion of results
into a retributive theory of punishment by analogizing punishment to a
moral "lottery."76 This argument, first advanced by philosopher David
Lewis, suggests that so long as a criminal offender is aware of the "odds"
of receiving severe result-based punishment in advance, there is
nothing unjust in determining his punishment on the basis of chance.77
Accordingly, it is fair to treat an offender who causes harm as if he had
"assumed the risk" of a variable penalty when he chose to behave
culpably.78
However, this response, too, fails to show that results
meaningfully bear on moral culpability. Even if Lewis is right that it is
not unfair to impose a "chancy" punishment for a "chancy" crime (and
even if we make the unlikely assumption that offenders always know
the odds of receiving result-based punishment in advance), 79 this alone
does not provide any positive justification for doing so. The fact, if true,
that it does not violate norms of "fairness" to use lottery-style
punishments against a criminal offender does not entail that such
punishments track the extent of his moral culpability. Furthermore,
even if differential punishment is permitted from a retributivist point
of view, it does not follow that it is required of us, or that "we have
73. Id. at 382.
74. See Neil Levy & Tim Bayne, Doing Without Deliberation: Automatism, Automaticity, and
Moral Accountability, 16 INT'L REV. PSYCHIATRY 209 (2004).
75. Morse, supra note 54, at 383.
76. See David Lewis, The Punishment That Leaves Something to Chance, 18 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 53, 58 (1989).
77. Id. at 63-67; see also MOORE, supra note 5, at 203 ("[I]nstead of seeking to eliminate
vagueness in legal predicates ... we should attach remedies to such predicates that match them
in their vagueness."). There is, however, no good reason to think that all criminal offenders are
aware of the various levels of risk that they will face, each of a number of variable possible
punishments at the time they offend.
78. Binder, supra note 40, at 730.
79. MOORE, supra note 5, at 203.
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affirmatively justified this choice among permitted approaches to
punishment."80
Finally, some commenters have suggested that an added
measure of punishment is warranted when an offender brings about a
harmful result, not because the offender has done anything more
culpable, but because the offender experiences "undeserved
gratification" as a result of having succeeded in bringing his criminal
design to fruition.81 This theory, of course, is only relevant with regard
to intentional offenses. Indeed, non-intentional offenders will generally
be worse off by virtue of having caused an unintended harmful result-
i.e., the typical drunk driver who accidentally runs over an innocent
pedestrian would strongly prefer not to have done so, and not just
because having caused the pedestrian harm will render him eligible for
an increased measure of criminal punishment.
Even for intentional offenses, however, the "undeserved
gratification" theory falls far short of a compelling explanation for the
practice of differential punishment. To the extent that an intentional
offender is enriched, in a monetary sense, by completing his own
criminal offense-for instance, by successfully robbing his victim of her
valuables-there are various legal mechanisms outside of criminal
punishment (such as asset forfeiture and disgorgement) available to
return the offender to the economic position he enjoyed before
committing the offense. And to the extent that the "undeserved
gratification" in question is an increase in psychological well-being
associated with bringing about one's desired result, this, too, lacks
adequate explanatory power to account for the practice of differential
punishment. First, it is debatable whether an offender's ex post facto
satisfaction with his past behavior is a legitimate subject of retributive
punishment at all (mere thoughts, unaccompanied by additional action,
generally do not incur scrutiny from the criminal law). And, second,
even if it were the case that combating such psychological satisfaction
was a proper basis for enhanced punishment, the practice of differential
punishment sweeps far too broadly to accomplish this limited aim.
While some intentional offenders undoubtedly feel gratified on account
of having, for instance, killed their neighbor, many other offenders come
to regret their behavior, wishing instead that their criminal courses of
action had failed. If differential punishment were truly explained by an
"undeserved gratification" theory, one might expect that repentant
80. Binder, supra note 40, at 730-31. At most, a moral lottery should provide an outer limit
(a negative constraint) on what an offender can be justly punished for.
81. See id. at 733-35 (discussing the undeserved gratification argument and reinterpreting
it "as a display of respect for victims").
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offenders would fall outside of its scope. But the added measure of
punishment attributable to having completed an offense is imposed on
repentant offenders, as well, because whether an offender is subject to
differential punishment turns exclusively on whether the offender
brings about a statutory harm, not the offender's subsequent attitude
toward having done so.
Ultimately, none of these arguments successfully undermine the
idea that two actors who behave in the same manner with the same
mental state are equally culpable for their actions, even if only one of
those offenders' actions brings about a statutory harm.
C. Incapacitation
Another widely accepted justification for criminal punishment is
the incapacitation of dangerous offenders.82 Under this theory, the
criminal justice system should identify and isolate dangerous offenders
in order to protect society from future crimes.8 3 In order to justify
differential punishment in reference to incapacitation, therefore, it
must be the case that, holding action and mental states constant, those
offenders whose actions lead to harmful results pose a greater risk to
society than those whose do not. We argue that this is not the case.
Consider our earlier hypothetical offenders Albert and Ben, who
each shoot at their bosses intending to kill them. Imagine that Albert
hits and kills his boss, while Ben misses his boss, who subsequently
escapes to safety. Assuming that the offenders are otherwise identical
in all respects that would tend to indicate their level of dangerousness
(i.e., they have the same firearm, the same level of firearm expertise,
and the same motive, etc.), there is no apparent reason to believe that
Albert is more dangerous than Ben, and consequently no greater need
to incapacitate him.8 4
By and large, those who advance incapacitation as a justification
for differential punishment do not dispute this point. Rather, these
theorists offer some variation on a "dangerousness theory": given that
the criminal justice system may lack objective indicia of an offender's
dangerousness, the most effective means of distinguishing dangerous
from non-dangerous offenders is to look to whether an offender actually
82. Of course, incapacitation is not without controversy. For instance, many Kantians
disagree with all utilitarian theories of punishment.
83. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (2012).
84. In fact, we might even think there is a more urgent need to incapacitate Ben, given that
he may want to murder his still-living boss.
1519
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
caused harm in a given case. 85 Though it seems inherently problematic
to base an assessment of an individual's dangerousness on a single data
point, the dangerousness theory rests on the tenable proposition that
the class of offenders who cause harm are statistically more likely to be
harmful than the class of offenders who do not. 8 6 For instance, the
average drunk driver who killed a pedestrian was probably driving
more dangerously, and is therefore more likely to hurt someone in the
future, than was the average drunk driver who did not.
Yet, even if these statistical assumptions are valid, there are at
least two foundational issues with the dangerousness theory as a
justification for differential punishment. First, like any rough proxy, it
is necessarily over- and underinclusive in that it unnecessarily
lengthens the sentence of many offenders who pose little risk to society,
while failing to incapacitate many truly dangerous offenders. Second,
causation of harm is far from the best (and, indeed, is likely a very poor)
measure of any individual offender's dangerousness 8 7-prior criminal
history, mental health, or even demographic information like age,
gender, and race, would likely be stronger proxies for likelihood of
future criminal behavior.88
Consider again the scenario with Albert and Ben, yet imagine
this time that Albert is an otherwise meek law professor who has never
used a firearm before, whereas Ben is a sociopath with extensive
firearms training. A rational observer who was aware of their respective
backgrounds should conclude that Ben is more dangerous than Albert,
despite the fact that Albert (and not Ben) happened to succeed in killing
his boss. Yet the dangerousness theory would suggest that we have
greater reason to incapacitate Albert than Ben. Innumerable
85. See, e.g., ROGER W. HAINES, JR., FRANK 0. BOWMAN, III, & JENNIFER C. WOLL, FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES HANDBOOK: 2007 EDITION § 211.1, at 348-49 (2006) ("Actual loss is
primarily a measure of harm to the victim. It is also an imprecise proxy for culpable mental state
and social dangerousness insofar as actual loss must be foreseeable to the defendant."); Posner,
supra note 23, at 1194; Note, Why Do Criminal Attempts Fail? A New Defense, 70 YALE L.J. 160,
166 (1960) ('"The much lower degree of punishment meted out to attempters represents, in part,
an unarticulated recognition that the person who tries and fails is often less dangerous than the
person who succeeds in his criminal purpose.").
86. Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 1589 ("It is statistically inevitable that those who have caused
harm will on the average have created higher risks, in terms of circumstances of which they should
have been aware, than those who did not cause harm.").
87. For certain minor offenses (such as trespassing and traffic violations), causation of harm
might in fact be the strongest available proxy for an offender's culpable action and mental state.
In other words, detecting culpable behavior and mental states in respect to these offenses in the
absence of the statutory harm occurring may be so difficult that it is not worth law enforcement
resources to pursue given the limited risk such behavior actually imposes. For further discussion,
see infra Section IV.B.
88. Of course, using some of these proxies, such as race and gender, might violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
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hypotheticals could be drawn that lead to similarly counterintuitive
conclusions.
Why, then, should the causation of harm automatically subject
offenders to often vast increases in punishment? Supporters of the
dangerousness theory have not provided anything approaching a
satisfactory answer to this question.
D. Rehabilitation
A final offender-facing justification for punishment is the
rehabilitation of criminal offenders. Insofar as those who have
committed crimes have deviated from acceptable societal standards, the
penal system might function as a tool to bring them back in line with
social norms. 89 If rehabilitation is to justify differential punishment,
then, it must be the case that those offenders who cause harm require
more extensive rehabilitation than those that do not. This might be the
case either because those offenders most in need of rehabilitation are
more likely to succeed in bringing about harm, or because causing harm
itself affects offenders in such a way that leads them more urgently to
require rehabilitation. Ultimately, however, neither of these
considerations properly provide a basis for differential punishment.
First of all, there is no reason to think that the amount of harm
an offender causes through a given course of action is a good proxy for
his need for rehabilitation. There is an absolute dearth of evidence in
both the legal and psychological literature to support this link, and, in
any event, there are likely far stronger proxies for how much
rehabilitation an offender needs than whether he brings about a
statutory harm. As Schulhofer points out, "[t]he proper disposition for
purposes of ... rehabilitation would presumably turn on the
defendant's background, personality, psychological problems, and
related factors, [and] not even in part on whether harm was caused."90
Thus, the issue of how much rehabilitation a specific offender needs is
much better handled on a case-by-case basis than by a regime of
differential punishment.
More importantly, even if it were the case that offenders who
caused harm were more in need of rehabilitation, there is overwhelming
evidence suggesting that longer prison sentences do not, in fact,
rehabilitate offenders. The often-traumatic experience of spending time
89. For a description of American criminal law's one-time use of, and ultimate rejection of,
rehabilitation as a justification for punishment, see Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes
of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1-6 (2003).
90. Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 1601.
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in prison does not decrease recidivism rates and is generally understood
to be counterproductive to the goal of reintegrating offenders into
society. As Richard Nygaard argues, "[m]ost criminal offenders who
change for the better do so in spite of prison not because of it."91 Indeed,
while rehabilitation was once one of the primary stated goals of the
American criminal justice system, 92 federal criminal law now explicitly
forbids judges from sentencing offenders to additional prison time for
the purpose of rehabilitating them.93
Rehabilitation does not provide an adequate justification for
differential punishment. Even if it were the case, which is doubtful, that
offenders who cause harm require greater rehabilitation, longer
sentences would be an ineffective, and indeed likely counterproductive,
means of doing so. If the criminal justice system truly sought to
rehabilitate offenders, courts could order proven methods of
rehabilitation, such as special psychological counseling or diversionary
programs, to offenders who needed them. However, in the status quo, it
seems impossible to defend differential punishment based on the
alleged rehabilitative aim of punishment.
As Schulhofer wrote in 1974, "[a] policy so pervasive and
important as the law's emphasis upon results might reasonably be
expected to stand upon some fairly weighty reasons capable of coherent
explanation."94 Yet as we have shown, none of the attempts by scholars
in the last few decades to justify such a regime based on the various
offender-facing justifications for punishment-deterrence, retribution,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation-have ultimately proved successful.
Therefore, we must look elsewhere for a justification for differential
punishment.
91. Richard Lowell Nygaard, Crime, Pain, and Punishment: A Skeptic's View, 102 DICK. L.
REV. 355, 362-63 (1998).
92. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 89.
93. 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (2012):
The court, in determining whether to impose a term of imprisonment, and, if a term of
imprisonment is to be imposed, in determining the length of the term, shall consider
the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, recognizing
that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and
rehabilitation.
94. Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 1514.
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II. VICTIM-FACING JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PUNISHMENT
While offender-facing justifications for punishment provide no
basis for differentiating criminal punishment based on whether or not
a statutory harm occurs, there is another set of justifications for
punishment that might be capable of doing so. Unlike offender-facing
theories, which focus exclusively on facts about offenders and their
conduct, these justifications look to the effects that criminal conduct has
on victims. That is, these justifications recognize that criminal acts are
not committed in a vacuum, but instead often have a dramatic impact
on those against whom they are perpetrated, and posit that the criminal
justice system should take the interests of victims into account when
determining how much to punish criminal offenders.
We will refer to these theories as victim-facing justifications for
punishment. Though this Article is the first to formally recognize this
category as such, the idea that victims' interests should factor into
criminal punishment occasionally appears in both case law and
academic commentary, and has been a central focus of the "victims'
rights" movement.95 When this idea does appear, it usually falls into
one of two broad categories: The first category is composed of various
expressive theories of punishment-that is, theories that suggest that
punishment sends a message, and the content and weight of that
message might appropriately vary with whether and how severely a
victim is harmed by criminal conduct. The second category is made up
of those theories that posit that the state should, for one reason or
another, channel victims' desires for revenge by increasing offenders'
punishment commensurate with the harm that their victims have been
made to suffer.
Both of these victim-facing justifications reflect a judgment
that, at times, the degree of punishment warranted by offender-facing
justifications might seem "insufficient" in light of the harm that a victim
has suffered. As a result, these victim-facing justifications make the
strongest case in favor of differential punishment when an offender
engages in conduct that implicates relatively modest offender-facing
justifications for punishment, but greatly harms his victim(s). These
theories are able to explain, therefore, why differential punishment's
impact is far greater with respect to non-intentional offenses than
intentional offenses, because for non-intentional offenses the scope of
the harm and the wrongfulness of an offender's behavior are likely to
95. See MARLENE YOUNG & JOHN STEIN, OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, THE HISTORY OF THE




diverge most widely. Accordingly, both of these categories of victim-
facing justifications, if they are valid reasons to punish, are at least to
some extent capable of justifying the practice of differential
punishment.
A. Victim-Facing Expressive Theories of Punishment
The first set of victim-facing justifications for criminal
punishment is made up of various expressive theories of punishment.
Many commentators have suggested that an important feature of
punishment is that it expresses public outrage at criminal offenses.96 In
the words of Joel Feinberg,
[P]unishment is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of resentment and
indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, on the part either of the
punishing authority himself or of those "in whose name" the punishment is afflicted.
Punishment, in short, has a symbolic significance largely missing from other kinds of
penalties.9 7
Certainly, some of the expressive function of criminal
punishment relates to the offender's moral culpability, and does not
have anything directly to do with the victim. Therefore, when we punish
a criminal offender, part of what we are doing may be "express[ing] the
judgment... of the community that what the criminal did was
wrong." 98 In this sense, expressive theories of punishment are related
to the retributive theories of punishment discussed in Part I.99 To the
extent that the expressive goal of criminal punishment merely tracks
an offender's moral culpability, then, such offender-facing expressivism
does not (as we have already shown with regard to retributivism) justify
differential punishment.
However, some expressive theories look beyond the moral desert
of the offender and explicitly take the victim and her situation into
account when determining the appropriate measure of punishment. In
other words, victim-facing expressive justifications "focus[ ] on the
victim and her dignity rather than [solely] on the perpetrator breaching
96. FEINBERG, supra note 45, at 98 ("That the expression of the community's condemnation
is an essential ingredient in legal punishment is widely acknowledged by legal writers.").
97. Id.
98. Id. at 100 ("At its best, in civilized and democratic countries, punishment surely expresses
the community's strong disapproval of what the criminal did. Indeed, it can be said that
punishment expresses the judgment (as distinct from any emotion) of the community that what
the criminal did was wrong.").
99. Indeed, some proponents of the expressive theory of punishment consider themselves to
be retributivists. See, e.g., Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM
AND ITS CRITICS (1990).
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the law."100 As Guyora Binder explains, "we punish harm not only in
order to express something to the offender and about the offender, but
also to express something to the victim and about the victim to
others." 101 Thus, expressive theories of punishment are capable of
"transcend[ing] doing justice to the offender" 102  by also
"communicat[ing] a dose of institutional solidarity with the victim." 10 3
Several proponents of such theories argue that the central
expressive value embodied in punishment is the imposition of "equality"
between victim and offender. For example, George Fletcher argues that
"[a] criminal act establishes a particular relationship" between an
offender and victim, whereby the offender "gains a form of dominance
that continues after the crime has supposedly occurred." 104 Thus,
according to Fletcher, "[t]he function of arrest, trial, and punishment is
to overcome this dominance and reestablish the equality of victim and
offender."105 Similarly, Jaime Goti argues that "[p]unishment thwarts
[this] imbalance and, conversely, [failure to punish] secures continuing
dominance" of the offender over the victim. 10 6
On a similar note, some commentators have suggested that the
expressive function of punishment takes the form of a duty, owed to
victims of crime, by the state. 107 According to this view, the failure to
punish criminal offenders for the harm that they have inflicted upon
their victims "becomes a means of acquiring indirect responsibility for
the crime."108 This alleged duty stems from the state's supposedly
authoritative role as an expositor of social values. 109
100. Jaime Malamud Goti, Equality, Punishment, and Self-Respect, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 497,
504 (2002).
101. Binder, supra note 40, at 733.
102. Id.
103. Goti, supra note 100, at 499.
104. George P. Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 51, 57 (1999).
105. Id. at 58.
106. Goti, supra note 100, at 498.
107. Adil Ahmad Haque, Group Violence and Group Vengeance: Toward A Retributivist Theory
of International Criminal Law, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 273, 283 (2005) ('"The state's duty to punish
offenders is owed to the victim of crime.").
108. Fletcher, supra note 104, at 63; id. at 61 ("The basic sentiment is that allowing crimes to
go unpunished somehow repeats the evil. It is as though the government and the entire society
becomes complicit in the occurrence of the crime.").
109. Goti, supra note 100, at 499-500 ("It follows that to attach an equalizing effect to
punishment presupposes that the courts' decisions are authoritative: that verdicts be perceived as
reflecting the truth about the facts as well as the right choice of rules and principles to judge these
facts."); id. at 504 ("[Crime victims'] sense of worthlessness and shame demands a 'political
remedy,'" and "[o]nly public admission by authoritative institutions that [the victims] were
wronged will legitimize [them] in [their] own eyes, and punishment of [offenders] ... is the clearest
and strongest statement to that effect.").
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Perhaps the most popular and well-known victim-facing
expressive theory of punishment, developed by Jean Hampton in the
late 1980s, takes this form and bears explaining in greater detail.110
Hampton's theory begins with the proposition that all members of
society possess "intrinsic, equal, and 'permanent'" value.111
Furthermore, she claims that our behavior is inherently expressive of
how much we value each other, such that when we treat people in a
manner inconsistent with the proposition that they possess equal value,
we are "in effect denying that [they] really ha[ve] that value." 112 If we
truly value crime victims as coequal members of society, Hampton
argues, we are obligated to refute the false claims1 13 made by criminal
offenders about their value. Otherwise, we are complicit in the
offender's wrongdoing, "communicat[ing] to the victim and to the wider
society the idea that such treatment, and the status it attributes the
victim, are appropriate."1 1 4
In order to refute the offender's false claim of superiority over
the victim, Hampton suggests that we "inflict on a wrongdoer
something comparable to what he inflicted on the victim."11 5 Doing so
equalizes the social status of offender and victim and rejects the
proposition that the offender is entitled to treat the victim in a way that
denies her value. Moreover, by allowing the victim to thereby "master"
the offender, the wrongdoer is "defeated in a way that makes the
relative value of victim and wrongdoer apparent" for all to see.116 As
such, Hampton argues, criminal punishment is a necessary method of
honoring all of society's members as equals.
A more general way of conceiving of the victim-facing expressive
value of punishment is to say that, even if the state punishes an
offender to the full extent justified by offender-facing theories of
punishment, it may nevertheless fail to punish the offender sufficiently
110. Hampton laid out this theory most prominently in HAMPTON, supra note 47, at 108-50;
JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111-61 (1988); and Hampton,
supra note 99, at 20.
111. By this, Hampton means something not dissimilar to the Declaration of Independence's
famous proclamation that "all men are created equal"-that people have, in some sense, innate
and equivalent value merely by virtue of being human. HAMPTON, supra note 47, at 121. Hampton
locates this egalitarian commitment, alternately, in notions of individual autonomy, political
liberalism, Kantianism, and Christianity.
112. HAMPTON, supra note 47, at 123.
113. This statement is false because everyone, under Hampton's view, in fact has equal
intrinsic value.
114. HAMPTON, supra note 47, at 133.
115. MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 110, at 128.
116. HAMPTON, supra note 47, at 141; see also MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 110, at 128
("While nobly intentioned, other means of affirming a victim's status (such as throwing a parade
in her honor) fail to erase the 'evidence of [the victim's] inferiority relative to the wrongdoer.' ").
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to be respectful in light of the harm that the victim has suffered.
Consider Chris, a drunk driver who hits an innocent pedestrian,
Danielle, paralyzing her from the waist down. Holding Chris's behavior
and mental state constant, had he not hit Danielle he would be guilty
simply of the crime of driving under the influence ("DUI"). DUI laws
typically permit only a few months' incarceration and, in practice,
usually do not result in any jail time whatsoever. But despite the fact
that the penalties for drunk driving presumably reflect the full extent
of the offender-facing justifications for punishing Chris, 117 it seems
potentially disrespectful in light of Danielle's paralysis to let Chris off
with only a modest fine. Victim-facing expressive justifications for
punishment seek to impose harsher sentences in such situations in
order to avoid this type of disrespect.
It is straightforward to see, then, that if victim-facing expressive
theories of punishment are valid they are capable of justifying
differential punishment in many cases. 118 For each of the theories
considered above, the amount of expressive punishment required
increases with the amount of harm done to the victim, holding constant
the offender's behavior and mental state. Take Jean Hampton's status-
based expressive theory: for offenses where no harm is inflicted on a
victim, no victim has had their status degraded in a way that requires
an additional measure of punishment to rebut the offender's false claim
of superiority over the victim. In other words, "[o]nly when [the victim]
is subjected to unredressed harm is he or she" subjected to "status
degradation" requiring a strong expressive response. 119 In this way,
victim-facing theories of expressive punishment seem to require a
practice of differential punishment to achieve their goals.
B. Vengeance-Based Theories of Punishment
The second set of victim-facing justifications for criminal
punishment posits that it is either permissible or required for the state
to mete out an extra measure of punishment in response to victims'
desire for revenge. This notion, that the state should channel victims'
117. This is because his underlying behavior is the same in both scenarios, which is all that
matters for offender-facing justifications for punishment.
118. Of course, like the other theories discussed in this Article, expressivism is not without its
detractors. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 1363, 1364 (2000).
119. Binder, supra note 40, at 736. Relatedly, one might be concerned that, by succeeding in
committing an offense, an offender has received an undeserved status enhancement. This
unwarranted enhancement, too, would be successfully rebutted by a reimposition of status equality
between offender and victim. For the possibility that criminal attempts also force a victim into
status degradation, see infra note 198.
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desire for "eye for an eye" retaliation, has proven to be at once one of
the most durable and most controversial justifications for criminal
punishment. And, as a number of commentators have suggested, the
increasingly influential "victims' rights" movement has been motivated
in large part by some victims' desire to utilize the criminal justice
system for just such vengeful motives. 120 As we will demonstrate,
vengeance, if justified as an end in itself or as an instrumental means
toward some other goal, is also potentially capable of justifying
differential punishment.
First, there are those who believe vengeance is a justified end in
itself; that victims of crime are entitled to a right of retaliation of some
kind against their offenders. This sentiment pervades popular culture:
from Alexandre Dumas's The Count of Monte Cristo to Sergio Leone's
Spaghetti Westerns, audiences are meant to cheer the protagonist's
quest for revenge without demanding that his every action comport
with some carefully reasoned moral calculus. Furthermore, some argue
that vengeance is central to "our very human moral psychology,"
informing our commonsense notions of justice. 121 These scholars
contend that revenge for its own sake is an accepted and deep-rooted
social norm that should be reflected in the norms of our criminal justice
system as well.122
Others have sought to justify institutionalized revenge on the
ground that victims "require[] a measure of vengeance for closure." 123
Thus, the state might be justified in prioritizing victims' desire for
vengeance over avoiding an additional imposition of punishment on
offenders,1 24 as victims, unlike offenders, are often free of any
wrongdoing in relation to an offense. While the empirical literature is
mixed as to the question of whether vengeance actually leads to better
long-term mental health outcomes for victims, at least some studies
120. See, e.g., Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 994
(1985) ("Recent victim's rights proposals appear to be driven more by the retaliatory view of
retribution than by the moral aspect of retribution.").
121. Ken Levy, Why Retributivism Needs Consequentialism: The Rightful Place of Revenge in
the Criminal Justice System, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 629, 656 (2014) ("Specifically, our desire to
achieve retributive justice-just deserts-is not sui generis but is itself motivated by a deeper
desire, the desire for revenge.").
122. See, e.g., SUSAN JACOBY, WILD JUSTICE: THE EVOLUTION OF REVENGE (1983).
123. Susan Bandes, When Victims Seek Closure: Forgiveness, Vengeance and the Role of
Government, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1599, 1605 (2000).
124. Robert C. Solomon, Justice and the Passion for Vengeance, in WHAT IS JUSTICE? 253
(Robert C. Solomon & Mark C. Murphy eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2000) (1990) ("[I]f
punishment no longer satisfies vengeance, if it ignores not only the rights but the emotional needs
of the victims of crime, then punishment no longer serves its primary purpose . . . ."); see also Bruce
Ledewitz & Scott Staples, No Punishment Without Cruelty, 4 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 41, 56 (1993)
("People who have been wronged, and who feel victimized, have a right to a level of revenge that
will help assuage their victimization.").
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purport to show that, under appropriate circumstances, retaliation can
help victims to achieve closure. 125
Of course, the idea that revenge for its own sake is a legitimate
goal of the criminal law is not without its detractors. Anyone familiar
with the adage "an eye for an eye leaves the whole world blind" is aware
that revenge has often, and forcefully, been characterized as outdated,
primitive, and barbaric. 126 And, in fact, the great majority of legal
academics and moral philosophers are critical of vengeance for precisely
these reasons. 127
Yet regardless of whether one accepts the proposition that
channeling victims' vengeance is a desirable end in itself, some scholars
and jurists suggest that it can be justified as a means of preventing
vigilante action on behalf of aggrieved crime victims. As Justice Stewart
argued in his concurrence in the landmark death penalty case Furman
v. Georgia, "channeling [the instinct for revenge] in the administration
of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the
stability of a society governed by law." 1 2 8 Without appeasing the public
desire for revenge, these commentators argue, we might descend into
"wild justice," whereby victims engage in extralegal means to exact
revenge. 129 Revenge may be, therefore, a necessary feature of any
politically viable criminal justice system. 130
Unsurprisingly, such consequentialist arguments for channeling
vengeance also have many prominent detractors. Some theorists
dispute the notion that it is necessary for the state to channel victims'
vengeance in order to prevent mob justice. Schulhofer, for example,
125. See, e.g., Eric Jaffe, The Complicated Psychology of Revenge, ASS'N PSYCHOL. Sc. (Oct.
2011), http://www.psychologicalscience.org/index.php/publications/observer/2011/october-11/the-
complicated-psychology-of-revenge.html [https://perma.cc/QS38-E3ND] (discussing and compiling
the psychological literature addressing the effects of vengeance on the mental health of victims).
126. As Robert Nozick notes, we should be highly skeptical of a practice rooted in the "pleasure
[of witnessing] the suffering of another." ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 367
(1981).
127. See, e.g., JONATHAN GLOVER, RESPONSIBILITY 145 (1970); Herbert Morris, Persons and
Punishment, in PUNISHMENT 75 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 1975); NOZICK, supra note
126, at 376. But see JACOBY, supra note 122; Solomon, supra note 124.
128. 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972).
129. See JACOBY, supra note 122. Of course, if the public's attitudes towards revenge itself
changed, vengeance-based punishment would no longer be a necessary feature of the criminal
justice system under this view.
130. Guyora Binder goes as far as to suggest that the channeling of victims' vengeance is a
political obligation of the state. See Binder, supra note 40, at 727:
[I]n asserting a monopoly on retaliatory force, the state deprives individuals and groups
of the option of securing their own dignity. In so doing, the state undertakes an
obligation to each individual to act on his or her behalf. . . .This promise to retaliate on
the victim's behalf is crucial in persuading the individual to transfer her loyalty from
the rivalrous group, clan, gang, or sect to the unitary state.
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claims that "[p]enalties we consider appropriate for other reasons would
almost certainly satisfy enough of the appetite for vengeance to forestall
private retaliation," because "the 'breaking-point' level of punishment,
below which mob violence could become a problem, is probably rather
low." 1 3 1 Other theorists claim that preventing vigilantism is "not even a
prima facie justifying reason for punishment," 13 2 because such concerns
are entirely outside of the proper purview of the criminal law.
Nevertheless, if one accepts, for any of the above reasons, that
the state should channel victims' vengeance, it, too, can serve as a
justification for engaging in differential punishment. 133 This is because
revenge, even more so than the victim-facing expressive theories, is a
justification for punishment that is inherently proportional to the
results of criminal action, as a victim's desire for revenge naturally
increases with the scope of the harm she has been made to suffer. As
Steven Eisenstat explains, "[r]ecompense, getting satisfaction,
matching like with like, giving what's coming to the wrongdoer,
equalizing crime and punishment, an eye for an eye; each of these
synonyms for revenge implies the proportionality of the scales of
justice."134 Thus, in a criminal justice system that channels victims'
desire for vengeance, we would expect that whether a harmful result
occurs would inform the magnitude of an offender's punishment. Much
like with the expressive theories outlined above, therefore,
institutionalized revenge, if it is a valid justification for criminal
punishment, can help explain and justify a regime of differential
punishment.
C. Who Qualifies as a Victim?
1. Direct vs. Secondary Victims
Before concluding our discussion in this Part, it is essential that
we make clear that we take "victim" in this Article to mean only the
person (or group of persons) who is the object of a crime: the "direct
victim." That is, it is only in regard to these direct victims of criminal
offenses that victim-facing justifications might serve to justify
131. Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 1511-12. However, this might not be the case in the Chris-
Danielle scenario explored above. See supra Section II.A.
132. MOORE, supra note 5, at 89-90 n.14.
133. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 133, at 1000 ("Thus, the only rationale for the criminal
sanction with which emphasizing the particular harm is consistent is that of retaliation.").
134. Steven Eisenstat, Revenge, Justice and Law: Recognizing the Victim's Desire for
Vengeance as a Justification for Punishment, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1115, 1136 (2004) (quoting
MARTHA MINOw, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 10 (1998)).
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differential punishment.135 In adopting this definition, we join the
commentary to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in asserting that the
"term 'victim' is not intended to include indirect or secondary
victims." 13 6 Determining who the victim of an offense is will generally
be a straightforward exercise in statutory interpretation, asking to
whom a statutory harm was done. Thus, the victim of a murder is the
deceased, whereas "the victim of a robbery is the person robbed." 137 Of
course, some criminal offenses do not have an "object," and thus have
no direct victim (i.e., drug possession offenses), which is an issue we will
return to in Part III.138
With our definition of victimhood, we do not mean to deny that
people other than the object of a statutory harm can be "victimized" in
some sense by a criminal offense-in the case of murder, the victim's
friends may mourn her death, her children be rendered motherless, and
her employer suffer economic burdens due to her absence. Without
diminishing the pain and misfortune these individuals may experience,
these "secondary victims" are irrelevant for the purposes of differential
punishment. 139
Although perhaps not intuitive, this is necessarily the case. To
see why, consider the crime of murder: whether an offender becomes
eligible for the higher penalties that in many jurisdictions accompany
murder (as opposed to the crime of attempted murder) depends solely
135. This definition closely resembles that in the sixth edition ofBlack's Law Dictionary. There
is actually significant debate as to the proper scope of victimhood in the criminal law. The Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure define victims simply as "person[s] directly and proximately harmed
as a result of the commission of . .. an offense." FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 advisory committee's note to
2008 amendments (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e) (2012)). In perhaps the most thorough treatment of
the issue, Andrew Nash has proposed the definition:
A victim is a person, capable of suffering injury, who has suffered an adequate injury
that was directly and proximately caused by the defendant's criminal conduct, and
whose injury was not a consequence of the person's own criminal conduct nor a
consequence of the person's consent to participate in the defendant's criminal conduct.
Andrew Nash, Note, Victims by Definition, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1419, 1457 (2008).
136. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 3D1.2 cmt. n.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
2004).
137. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1567 (6th ed. 1990).
138. See infra Section III.A. Importantly, victim-facing justifications for punishment apply
equally to deceased people, so long as they are the object of a criminal offense (such as in a
homicide, or when a victim dies of natural causes before his offender is sentenced). First,
expressive punishment is perfectly capable of validating the social standing, or showing respect to
the memory, of a deceased person. Moreover, most understandings of the concept of revenge allow
for dead people to be avenged by others-indeed, this may be the paradigmatic case of vengeance.
Similarly, the need to prevent vigilantism may be especially strong when the victim of a crime dies
as the result of a criminal offense.
139. But see Meghan J. Ryan, Proximate Retribution, 48 HOUs. L. REV. 1049 (2012) (claiming
the relevant class of victims for determining an offender's punishment should be expanded to
include certain secondary victims).
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upon whether he causes the death of another person (the statutory
harm for the crime of murder). Put another way, regardless of whether
the victim of the murder was a friendless, childless hermit or a beloved
community leader with a wife and kids, the offender is equally guilty of
the crime of murder if he kills the victim and equally guilty of the crime
of attempted murder if he tries and fails to do so. 140 In fact, this is true
even if the victim is universally reviled, such that there are countless
secondary beneficiaries of her demise!141 The lack of any necessary
connection between the existence or quantity of secondary victims, on
the one hand, and the offense committed, on the other, definitively
shows that secondary victims do not factor into differential punishment.
Put differently, although the commission of a criminal offense
may legitimately aggrieve "secondary victims," the harms that they
experience are a priori not statutory harms, as they are not included in
the statutory prerequisites for the crime. This is far from a hair-
splitting distinction-a central commitment of the criminal law is that
offenses must be statutorily defined and proven beyond a reasonable
doubt before a defendant can be punished for them. 142 That is, if a
secondary victim were the object of an offender's action in some
statutorily prohibited way, she would be a direct, and not a secondary,
victim. And, in fact, people are harmed by the behavior of others
constantly in ways not recognized by the criminal law.143 Regardless of
one's normative conclusions on this issue, it is clear as a descriptive
matter at least that only direct victims are relevant for the purposes of
explaining the practice of differential punishment.
2. Society as Victim?
While our definition of "victim" limits the category to the
person(s) that incur the statutory harm in question (i.e., the direct
victim(s) of the offense), some jurists and commentators have also
suggested that, in certain cases, society itself might be considered the
"victim" of a criminal offense. But while the notion that society can be
140. There are exceptions to this rule for certain classes of victims, such as "official victims,"
but the purpose of these provisions is to deter offenders from attacking law enforcement and other
government officials, not to recognize secondary victims.
141. Consider the hit TV show Dexter, whose title character only kills other dangerous
criminals. Though society plausibly benefits from the demise of Dexter's victims, he would still be
guilty of their murders if he were ever caught. Dexter (Showtime 2006-2013).
142. For instance, the Rule of Lenity provides that even if a given course of conduct is already
criminalized, a defendant should not be punished for violating it if the application of the statute
to his case was ambiguous.
143. Both administrative and civil law help fill the gap between the behaviors that harm
others and the behaviors that are currently criminalized.
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victimized by criminal conduct may sound familiar to some readers, this
notion is greatly under-theorized, and commentators often mean very
different, and at times confusing, things when invoking it.
For example, the term "crimes against society" is sometimes
used interchangeably with the popular phrase "victimless crimes" (a
category of crimes that includes many regulatory offenses). 144 In other
instances, the notion of society as a victim is invoked in the criminal
law, not as a claim about the literal victimization of society, but merely
as a placeholder that serves some procedural purpose. 145 Although there
are no prominent theories clearly articulating such views, crimes for
which society is taken to be the victim could also include (1) particularly
heinous offenses, such that the "public at large" is in some sense
victimized by their commission; or (2) criminal offenses that target
objects of cultural or national importance, such that "civilized society"
itself is somehow the target of the offense. 146 Yet despite the differences
between these views, we will argue below that theories of "societal
victimhood," as a class, play no role in justifying or explaining
differential punishment.
Our explanation begins by noting that, even if a coherent
general theory of societal victimhood could be articulated, any such
theory would necessarily have to employ one of two broad conceptions
of "society." Under the first view, society is merely an aggregation of its
individual members, such that "society" is the victim of an offense when
many (or all) of its individual members are harmed by it. Alternatively,
under the second view, society is conceived of as a distinct metaphysical
entity that itself can be directly victimized by criminal offenses, over
and above the individual victimization of its constituent members.
However, as we will show, both of these views are fundamentally
unsuited to explaining or justifying the practice of differential
punishment, because, under either view, society cannot serve as a direct
victim of a criminal offense to which victim-facing justifications for
punishment can reasonably apply.
144. For example, the National Incident-Based Reporting System categorizes "crimes against
society" as "prohibition[s] against engaging in certain types of activity; they are typically victimless
crimes. . . ." Crimes Against Persons, Property, and Society, UNIF. CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM:
NAVL INCIDENT-BASED REPORTING SYSTEM 1 (2012), https://ucr.fbi.gov/nibrs/2012/
resources/crimes-against-persons-property-and-society [https://perma.cc/L284-PXQE]
[hereinafter NIRB Fact Sheet].
145. For example, the section on grouping criminal counts in the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines states that "[flor offenses in which there are no identifiable victims . .. society at large
is the victim." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3D 1.2 cmt. n.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
2004).
146. For a discussion of the criminal prohibitions attending the destruction of Native
American cultural patrimony, see Roberto Iraola, A Primer on the Criminal Penalty Provisions of
the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 431 (2004).
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a. The "Aggregation" View of Society
Consider first the aggregation view of societal victimhood, which
holds that what it means for society to be victimized by a criminal
offense is that criminal conduct can have harmful effects that
reverberate throughout society. The "victimization" of society under
this aggregation view cannot explain differential punishment, however,
because the offenses it might reasonably apply to do not actually have
"society" as their direct victim. Instead, as we will show, this notion of
society is used as a stand-in to describe situations in which an offense
creates, or threatens to create, diffuse secondary victimizations of the
individuals that make up society. Because secondary victimizations, for
reasons described above, cannot explain differential punishment as a
descriptive matter, the aggregation view of society fails as a candidate
to explain or justify differential punishment.
To illustrate this point, let us take for an example the 1968
assassination of civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Because
Dr. King's murder unquestionably had a profound impact on countless
members of American society (as it was intended to), some might
consider his assassination "a crime against society." However, the far-
reaching societal ramifications of Dr. King's death had no bearing
whatsoever on the particular offense that his assassin, James Earl Ray,
was charged with and ultimately convicted of: namely, murder.147
Instead, what determined that Ray would be charged with, and
ultimately convicted of, the crime of murder was the fact that his bullet
proved lethal to Dr. King. That is, if Ray's bullet had not killed Dr. King,
he could not have been convicted of murder, no matter how evil his
intentions; alternatively, if he had killed someone other than Dr. King,
even if that individual did not have the same importance to society, he
would still be guilty of the same crime of murder. Thus, in light of the
fact that a "killing" was both necessary and sufficient for Ray to be
convicted of murder, it follows that Dr. King, and not the thousands of
his grieving supporters, was the "object" of the statutory harm of Ray's
offense from the perspective of the criminal law. From this, we can see
that a conception of societal victimhood as an aggregation of its
members' secondary victimizations necessarily fails to explain our
regime of differential punishment as a descriptive matter. 148
147. For Mr. Ray's obituary, which recounts his assassination of Dr. King, see Lawrence Van
Gelder, James Earl Ray, 70, Killer of Dr. King, Dies in Nashville, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 1998),
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/24/us/james-earl-ray-70-killer-of-dr-king-dies-in-
nashville.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/8UHF-FHM3].
148. In the event of hate crimes, which Dr. King's assassination would likely be classified
today, the group of intended victims would not be society but rather the members of the specific
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For another example, consider Ellen, a construction mogul
whose recklessness in constructing her new Los Angeles factory causes
enough chemical sludge to spill into a nearby river that she violates a
criminal prohibition against contaminating a municipal water supply.
In this scenario, some might claim that Ellen's offense was done to
"society" (under the "aggregation" view), insofar as it risked harm to
everyone in the community-i.e., to all water drinkers in Los Angeles.
However, this application of the aggregation view also fails to explain
or justify differential punishment.
In the first place, saying that the object of Ellen's pollution was
"all of the water drinkers in Los Angeles" strains beyond the breaking
point any reasonable conception of what it means for an individual to
be an object of an offender's action. In fact, it seems far more natural to
say that Ellen's offense simply had no object at all (in that it was not
directed at, or "done to," anyone in particular). More concretely, the sort
of "crime against society" that Ellen is guilty of under the anti-pollution
statute is a crime of risk-creation.14 9 As a result, whether or not Ellen is
guilty of the completed offense in question depends entirely upon
whether the statutory harm comes about (i.e., that the water becomes
polluted), and not whether anyone actually drinks the polluted water
or, if they do, ends up being harmed by it. In other words, any
downstream health consequences suffered by Los Angeles residents are
secondary harms of Ellen's offense, which do not need to be proven at
trial in order for Ellen to be convicted under the anti-pollution
statute.150 In fact, Ellen would be guilty of the completed offense even if
the municipality successfully employed water decontamination
measures that negated all possible risk that the polluted water could
ultimately harm anyone, as the "statutory harm" of contaminating the
water supply would still would have occurred even if it was immediately
remedied.
Put differently, while Ellen's offense raises the prospect of harm
befalling any number of individuals, there is no direct victim of the
gender, racial, or ethnic group singled out by the offender (in this case, African Americans). See
Adil Ahmad Haque, Group Violence and Group Vengeance: Toward a Retributivist Theory of
International Criminal Law, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 273, 314 (2005):
Though all would be justified in expressing outrage and disgust [at racist policies
targeted toward African Americans], only one group could properly express resentment.
There was only one party in interest, only one group with its own grievance to litigate,
and only members of one group had standing to bring suit. Racial segregation was not
merely wrongful in the abstract; it was a wrong inflicted upon African-Americans.
149. Risk-creation alone, without an accompanying harm, is not generally considered to be a
criminal harm, or at least not one that triggers differential punishment. For additional discussion,
see infra note 202.
150. That is, unless Ellen could be charged with a separate offense for which these individuals
would be direct victims.
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offense itself, as no one need actually be affected by Ellen's behavior for
the offense to have been committed. Of course, it is possible that Ellen
could be convicted under a separate statute of an offense that requires
that individuals end up actually being poisoned by the contaminated
water-but in that case, the poisoned individuals, and not society in the
aggregate, would be the direct victims of that separate offense.
What both of these examples illustrate, therefore, is that
"society," as understood under the aggregate view, can never be the
direct victim or "object" of a criminal offense. Rather, the aggregate
view of "societal victimhood" inevitably boils down to an account of
numerous "secondary victimizations," which, as explained above, are
simply irrelevant to differential punishment as a descriptive matter.
b. The "Metaphysical" View of Society
Theories of societal victimization that presuppose a more
abstract and robust conception of "society" are similarly unsuited to
justifying the practice of differential punishment. Under this type of
"metaphysical" view, society is regarded as a social construct that is
itself capable of being directly victimized by crime, over and above the
victimization of its constituent members. An account of "societal
victimization" under a "metaphysical" view of society would not suffer
from the same infirmity as the aggregation view-insofar as harming
society in the metaphysical sense would not merely amount to
widespread "secondary victimizations." However, even if one were to
accept a robust "metaphysical" view of societal victimhood, one still
would not be able to justify differential punishment by applying the
various victim-facing theories to it. This is because applying victim-
facing justifications for punishment to society itself would require one
to rely on misguided, and ultimately incoherent, analogies between the
needs and characteristics of society and ordinary human victims.
To illustrate, consider a private art gallery owner who violates a
criminal statute forbidding the destruction of "culturally significant
works of art" by lighting Picasso's Les Demoiselles d'Avignon (which she
recently acquired from MoMA) on fire. Because the gallery owner owns
the painting, if there is any direct victim of the offense it would appear
to be society itself-one might, for instance, call it an attack on
"Western Civilization." That is, unlike the crime of murder that James
Earl Ray was charged with-for which the fact that "society" was
harmed was incidental, rather than necessary, for the commission of
the offense-the statutory harm specified in the gallery owner's crime
specifically references the way in which society is ostensibly harmed by
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it (i.e., it is necessary for conviction that the artwork be "culturally
significant"). 151
Yet even if the best way to characterize the direct victim of the
gallery owner's crime (to the extent there is one) is to call it "society,"
this still would not justify differential punishment with respect to such
offenses. This is because, as we have argued above, differential
punishment can only be justified in reference to victim-facing theories.
And "society," unlike ordinary human victims of crime, does not require,
nor benefit from, either expressive or vengeance-based punishment. So
while the offender-facing justifications for punishing the gallery owner
(e.g., that her behavior was wrongful, that she should be deterred from
similar future acts, and that she may need incapacitation and
rehabilitation) remain entirely valid, the victim-facing justifications
that might otherwise explain the practice of differential punishment do
not apply to crimes where "society" is ostensibly the direct victim. 1 52
Consider first the vengeance-based justifications: it is unclear
what it would mean for society, in this metaphysical sense, to "desire"
vengeance. As we explained in Section II.B, vengeance only makes
sense insofar as it stems from some basic human psychological desire,
such that channeling victims' revenge might promote their
psychological wellbeing in instances where offender-facing
justifications would otherwise not justify "sufficient" punishment to
satisfy such desires. However, this consideration does not apply if
society itself is taken to be the direct victim of a crime, because society
(understood as an abstract conceptual entity) does not have "desires,"
nor does it possess a "mind" such that it would be intelligible to discuss
its mental health. Put simply, it seems bizarre to attribute a literal
"desire for vengeance" onto an abstract social construct. 153 Moreover,
even if society could somehow "desire" vengeance, it would make no
sense to say that society should support an institution of differential
punishment in order to prevent its own vigilantism, because a
metaphysical entity obviously cannot engage in extralegal vigilante
action. Vengeance-based theories of punishment, once untethered from
151. We might therefore characterize the statutory harm in Ray's offense (i.e., King's death)
as a "private" statutory harm, insofar as it is specific to King, while the statutory harm in the
gallery owner's crime (i.e., the destruction of a culturally important artwork) is "public" in nature,
insofar as it speaks to the crime's impact on society as a whole.
152. This is not to say that crimes like the gallery owner's could not potentially harm society
in some special way, or that we might not want to punish the art gallery owner an extra measure
because her action was directed at society itself. But rather, as we will show, neither vengeance-
based nor expressive differential punishment is warranted regardless of the validity of such
concerns.
153. See, e.g., Ned Block, Troubles with Functionalism, in PERCEPTION AND COGNITION 261 (C.
Wade Savage ed., 1978).
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the human element that makes them comprehensible, cease to make
sense when the abstract metaphysical construct of "society" is taken to
be the victim of a crime. Accordingly, vengeance-based victim-facing
justifications for punishment cannot reasonably extend to crimes where
society is the direct victim.
Victim-facing expressive theories of punishment, the only other
possible justification for the practice of differential punishment, are
also incapable of justifying differential punishment when "society" itself
is the purported victim of a criminal offense. To understand why, it is
first important to re-emphasize the distinction between offender-facing
and victim-facing expressive theories of punishment. Offender-facing
expressive theories generally justify criminal punishment either as a
means of expressing society's condemnation of an offender's conduct, or
as a means of reaffirming the importance of abiding by society's
criminal laws. 154 Given the importance of Picasso's paintings to our
society's cultural heritage, therefore, one might think that there are
particularly strong reasons to punish the gallery owner in order to
express condemnation of her decision to burn the painting, as well as to
condemn her blatant disregard of the criminal prohibition against doing
so. And such a position would seem entirely reasonable in this case.
However, these offender-facing expressive justifications for
punishing the gallery owner, like all offender-facing justifications for
punishment, are concerned exclusively with the gallery owner's
behavior (i.e., the act of burning the painting), rather than the results
of her behavior (i.e., the fact that the painting was actually destroyed).
That is, as we demonstrated in Part I in our discussion of retributivism,
society simply has no basis for expressing greater moral condemnation
of the gallery owner who successfully burns a painting than the gallery
owner who tries, but fails to do so. 155
Unlike offender-facing expressive theories, however, victim-
facing expressive theories of punishment are concerned with the results
of an offender's actions on his victim(s), rather than exclusively with his
behavior. According to these victim-facing expressive theories, the
state, in its role as the authoritative expositor of social values, punishes
offenders in order to express respect to victims and to reaffirm their
social value. 156
But applying this rationale to society itself yields bizarre results.
That is, it is hard to know what it would mean for the state to need to
154. See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 46, at 602 ("But it is also possible to use the expressive view
to inform desert.... The proper retributive punishment is the one that appropriately expresses
condemnation and reaffirms the values that the wrongdoer denies.").
155. See supra Section I.B.
156. See supra Section II.A.
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punish an offender in light of the harm she has caused to society-
beyond what is warranted, for example, by the offender-facing
justifications for punishing the gallery owner for her behavior-in order
to reaffirm the value of, or show respect to, society as a whole. Generally,
victim-facing expressive punishment serves to re-establish equality
between an offender and victim after the offender has demeaned the
victim. But criminal offenses obviously cannot create the same concerns
about "equality" between an individual and society itself that they do
between offenders and individual victims. More generally, it is unclear
that it is even possible for an individual offender to successfully
diminish society's value in its own eyes (whatever that could possibly
mean). And, indeed, there do not appear to be any proponents in the
academic literature of such a strange view of expressive punishment.
Therefore, while the gallery owner's crime implicates strong
offender-facing justifications for punishment, victim-facing expressive
theories simply do not make sense as applied to the limited class of
offenses for which "society," rather than any more discrete individual
or group of individuals, might be considered the direct victim of a
criminal offense. Accordingly, even if the subject of "societal
victimization" ultimately receives more robust treatment in the
academic literature, it will nevertheless remain the case that "society,"
understood under either the aggregation or metaphysical view, is not
the type of "victim" capable of justifying the practice of differential
punishment.
Unlike offender-facing justifications for criminal punishment,
victim-facing justifications provide a possible theoretical avenue
through which to explain the institution of differential punishment in
the American criminal justice system. And this makes intuitive sense:
only theories that take the interests of victims into account will be able
to justifiably condition punishment on whether harm befalls those
victims.
The importance of this point must not be overlooked: while the
reader may not accept as legitimate the various expressive and
vengeance-based theories of punishment outlined above, they are the
only theories capable of justifying differential punishment. If one rejects
them, one must also reject the conclusion that the practice of
differential punishment is rationally justifiable.
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III. WHERE DIFFERENTIAL PUNISHMENT IS UNJUSTIFIED
As we demonstrated in Part II, victim-facing justifications for
punishment, if valid, are capable of justifying differential punishment
with respect to at least some offenses. Moreover, because offender-
facing justifications for punishment are categorically incapable of
justifying differential punishment, as demonstrated in Part I,
differential punishment can only be justified, if at all, by these victim-
facing justifications.
Yet even if one accepts the validity of one or more of the victim-
facing justifications, it is necessarily the case that such justifications
will not apply to every criminal offense. That is, in many instances,
there will be no victim who stands in an appropriate relation with the
offender such that either expressive or vengeance-based theories are
available to explain the practice of differential punishment. In these
instances, we argue, differential punishment is categorically
unjustified.
In this Part, we examine three broad categories of offenses for
which it is inappropriate to apply a regime of differential punishment.
The first category consists of those offenses for which there is no
"object"-that is, no direct victim-of the offense. The second category
is composed of offenses for which there is an object, but for which that
"victim" either consented to or was otherwise culpable for the
commission of the offense. A final category of offenses is that for which
there is an identifiable, non-culpable victim, but for which that victim
explicitly disavows her interest in both expressive and vengeance-based
punishment on her behalf. What unites each of these three categories
is their deviation from the "paradigm" criminal offense, where a hostile
offender directly victimizes an innocent and aggrieved individual.
While the victim-facing justifications for punishment are equipped to
explain differential punishment in such cases, they are inapplicable to
the types of offenses explored in this Part.
A. Crimes for Which There Is No "Object"
The first class of criminal offenses for which there is no
justification for differential punishment is made up of those offenses for
which there is no "object," and thus no direct victim for whom victim-
facing justifications for punishment might apply. As we demonstrated
in Part II, the only possible justifications for differential punishment
are victim-facing-those predicated on some consideration relating to
the harm suffered by victims. Yet, for certain crimes, such as illegal
gambling, drug possession, and failure to obey traffic laws, as well as a
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myriad of other regulatory offenses, 15 7 there is no readily identifiable
direct victim to validate the application of victim-facing justifications.
These behaviors are criminalized because of their aggregate "antisocial"
effects, not because any individual instance of their commission will
necessarily lead to harm befalling sonie victim. 15 8 It stands to reason,
then, that only offender-facing justifications for punishment are
available for such "antisocial" crimes, and differential punishment is
categorically unwarranted.
Consider, for example, an arms dealer, Frank, who is caught
smuggling prohibited weapons into the country by the U.S. Border
Patrol, which seizes all of the weapons just on the American side of the
U.S.-Canadian border. 159 Though, as a legal matter, Frank has
completed the offense of "smuggling" (because he has successfully
brought prohibited weapons into the country), his offense has not
created any obvious victims (given that the weapons were seized before
they had the opportunity to do any harm). It is true, of course, that an
influx of weapons into a community can often cause significant harm
and pose serious risks to the members of that community.160 However,
the "statutory harm" associated with the crime of weapons smuggling
is merely the result that the prohibited weapons enter the country-
whether any harm to the community associated with the presence of
those weapons actually materializes is irrelevant to whether the crime
157. For an overview and discussion of regulatory offenses, many of which are considered mala
prohibita, see Mireille Hildebrandt, Justice and Police: Regulatory Offenses and the Criminal Law,
12 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 43 (2009).
158. Rebecca S.T. Khalil, Protecting the Victims of "Victimless" Crimes, NAT'L CRIME VICTIM
LAW INST. 1 (Summer 2011), http://law.1clark.edullive/files/15299-protecting-the-victims-of-
victimless-crimes [https://perma.cc/ACR2-EQD2] ("It is sometimes said that'victimless' crimes are
those that violate the ordered functioning of society in general, as opposed to those that directly
harm individuals."). The reader may be tempted to characterize these types of "antisocial" crimes
as somehow victimizing society itself, although the authors find it far more natural to think that
such crimes are simply not "done to" anyone at all, and thus have no direct victims. See NIRB Fact
Sheet, supra note 144, at 1 (categorizing certain offenses as crimes against society). Moreover, the
vast majority of these objectless offenses make a far weaker case for societal victimization than
those discussed in Section II.C do, since they are not "directed" or "targeted" at society in the way
Dr. King's assassination or the burning of the Picasso painting were. See supra Section II.C. But
in any event, as demonstrated in Section II.C, even if one were to adopt a view that these are
"crimes against society," "society," in either the aggregate or metaphysical understanding of that
term, cannot serve as a victim in regard to which the victim-facing justifications for punishment
can reasonably apply. See supra Section II.C.
159. For an example of a federal offense that Frank could be charged with, see 18 U.S.C. § 545
(2012), which prohibits knowingly bringing any merchandise that is illegal in the United States
across the borders through any method.
160. This risk that such behavior poses to the community is presumably why doing so is a
crime in the first place.
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has been completed. 161 In other words, any "downstream" consequences
that may result from Frank's behavior function as "secondary harms,"
which play no role in determining whether or not Frank is guilty of
smuggling.
Moreover, in many cases, the criminal law creates an entirely
different classification of offense when the behavior underlying an
objectless crime does end up seriously harming some individual.
Consider again our drunk driver Chris. If Chris drives home under the
influence of alcohol without hitting anyone, he is merely guilty of drunk
driving, a crime that has no direct victim, and to which victim-facing
justifications for punishment would therefore not apply. Yet, if Chris
happens to hit and kill Danielle on his way home, thereby "directly
victimizing" her, he can be charged with a different offense-vehicular
homicide-to which victim-facing justifications for punishment do
apply in light of the statutory harm of Danielle's death. 162 The fact that
Chris is deemed to have committed an entirely different offense once he
brings about a statutorily specified criminal harm underscores the point
that punishment for "antisocial" offenses, such as drunk driving, is
justified entirely by offender-facing concerns like deterrence,
retribution, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.
Thus, for objectless crimes in which no direct victim exists for
whom it makes sense to express sympathy or channel vengeance,
differential punishment is simply without justification, as no victim-
facing justifications are available.
B. Consent and Shared-Culpability Crimes
Another category of offenses for which differential punishment
is unjustified is composed of those offenses for which the victims
themselves have consented to the commission of the offense, or are
otherwise culpable for the offense in some way. Even though these
crimes have an "object," in that they are "done with" or "done to"
someone, it is inappropriate to punish offenders for these crimes based
on the victim-facing justifications for punishment. That is because, as
we will explain below, these victims lack the requisite "standing" in
order to have their vengeance channeled or to receive the "status
161. That is to say, differential punishment in this situation is triggered solely by the fact that
the weapons actually enter the United States-if Frank were stopped on the Canadian side of the
border instead, he would have merely attempted the offense.
162. For a list of the penalties an offender can receive in each state for vehicular homicide for
which he was intoxicated, see Penalties for Drunk Driving Vehicular Homicide, MOTHERS AGAINST
DRUNK DRIVING 1 (May 2012), http://www.madd.org/laws/law-overview/
VehicularHomicideOverview.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JPP-Z6EQ].
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benefits" of expressive punishment in the way that non-consenting,
non-culpable victims might. 163 In her book Victims'Rights and Victims'
Wrongs, Vera Bergelson makes a related argument to the effect that a
victim's consent to, or shared-culpability for, an offense can "abridge[ ]
his right not to be harmed and, therefore, completely or partially
justif[y] the [offender] by eliminating or mitigating the [offender's]
responsibility for the harm." 1 6 4 Our theory thus provides a theoretically
satisfying means of actualizing that intuition: we should not apply a
regime of differential punishment to offenses for which a victim
consents or has unclean hands.
1. Consent Crimes
For some crimes, such as assisted suicide, 165 sale of narcotics,166
and the smuggling of illegal immigrants, 167 the "objects" of the criminal
offense (i.e., the deceased patient, the recipient of the narcotics, and the
undocumented migrants, respectively) are not really "victims," as we
ordinarily understand that term, because they consented to the
criminal act that was "done to them." As we will argue, differential
punishment is not appropriate for such "consent crimes," because
victim-facing justifications for punishment do not apply to willing
objects of criminal acts.
It is essential to note that our claim that victim-facing
justifications for punishment do not extend to "consent crimes" only
applies when the object of the crime fully and validly consents to the
criminal act in question. The crime of statutory rape, for example,
would not count as a "consent crime," because minors are not able to
163. One might think that, in certain circumstances, victim-facing justifications might be
reduced, but not eliminated entirely, due to a victim's consent, forgiveness, or culpable conduct. In
these circumstances, our framework might suggest that a judge reduce the measure of differential
punishment for an offense, but not eliminate it entirely. Presenting a more fine-grained framework
that discusses the application of our framework to these particular circumstances is beyond the
scope of this Article. As an interesting point of comparison, this discussion closely mirrors the
debate between the comparative and contributory negligence approaches to determining liability
in tort law.
164. VERA BERGELSON, VICTIMS' RIGHTS AND VICTIMS' WRONGS: COMPARATIVE LIABILITY IN
CRIMINAL LAW 61 (2009) (emphasis omitted).
165. For example, see Tennessee's assisted suicide law. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-216(a) (West
2017) ("A person commits the offense of assisted suicide who ... [i]ntentionally provides another
person with the means by which such person directly and intentionally brings about such person's
own death. . . ."),
166. For example, see Minnesota's sale of a controlled substance statute. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 152.023(1) (West 2017) ("A person is guilty of controlled substance crime in the third degree if ...
the person unlawfully sells one or more mixtures containing a narcotic drug .... .").
167. For a discussion of the role of "victims" in immigrant trafficking offenses, see Nash, supra
note 135, at 1454-56.
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give legal consent to sexual acts with older persons. 168 Similarly, an
individual who agrees to illegally sell her kidney under duress has not
"consented" to the criminal sale of a bodily organ, as her consent to the
sale was not freely given.169 Importantly, what excepts these two
scenarios from being considered consent crimes is not that these
activities are illegal-because, of course, all consent crimes are illegal-
but rather that the "consent" itself is defective in such a way so as not
to discharge the viability of victim-facing justifications for
punishment.170
Yet, in many instances, individuals who are the objects of a
criminal offense do properly consent to the criminal act in question, and
are thus not "victimized" by it in a way that triggers victim-facing
justifications for punishment. For example, if George sells Harold
marijuana, Harold is the "object" of George's crime of narcotics
distribution (in that George sold the drugs to Harold). However, it
would be odd to say that Harold was the "victim" of George's crime, such
that victim-facing justifications for punishment are warranted on
Harold's behalf.
To better illustrate this point, consider first the expressive
theories of punishment: a person who validly consents to the
commission of a criminal offense for which he is the object of the
statutory harm both "deserves" less of a showing of respect in relation
to the offense than would an entirely innocent victim, and has not been
"demeaned" in the same way that he would have been had he not
consented. To use our above example, it would be bizarre to say that
society owes it to Harold to punish George over and above what would
be warranted by the offender-facing justifications for punishing George
in order to recognize any "harm" that Harold might have suffered by
coming into possession of the marijuana. To put it in terms of
Hampton's theory of expressive punishment, 171 because his transaction
with Harold was consensual, George has not made any "false
statement" in need of correcting concerning his social value relative to
Harold's.
Similarly, it seems intuitive that a "victim" who has validly
consented to an offender's behavior is not entitled to have his vengeance
168. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual
Autonomy, 122 YALE L.J. 1372, 1441 (2013) (clarifying that minors cannot legally give consent to
sex with older persons).
169. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND
THE FAILURE OF LAW (2000).
170. For two attempts to create a workable version of consent for the purposes of the criminal
law, see Rubenfeld, supra note 168 and SCHULHOFER, supra note 169.
171. See supra Section II.A.
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"channeled" with respect to that behavior. That is, whatever appeal
"eye-for-an-eye" revenge may have in the ordinary course of criminal
behavior is extinguished when the victim himself consents to the
(nevertheless illegal) taking of his eye. As Bergelson argues, "I may be
objectively hurt by my consent and I may subjectively regret it.
Nonetheless, my rights have not been violated." 172 Moreover, in the vast
majority of cases, the objects of such "consensual crimes" will not even
desire vengeance in the first place. There is no reason, for instance, to
suppose that an individual who has voluntarily sold her kidney on the
black market would want to "avenge" the loss of her kidney; nor should
the law recognize any such desire.173
Despite the fact that such crimes do not necessarily "victimize"
anybody in particular, consent crimes may have serious detrimental
effects on society in the aggregate. 174 An illegal sale of a bodily organ,
for example, may benefit both parties to the sale in a given instance,
but may nevertheless lead to an undesirable state of affairs if such
transactions became the norm. 175 Thus, important offender-facing
justifications such as deterrence and retribution may still remain valid
with regard to such offenses. 176 Yet, because victim-facing justifications
do not apply, differential punishment is not appropriate for crimes to
which "victims" give full and free consent.
2. Shared-Culpability Crimes
Victim-facing justifications for punishment also do not apply (or
are at least diminished) in instances where the victim herself shares a
substantial degree of culpability for causing the statutory harm that
she has suffered. In the context of tort law, this notion is reflected in
the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and unclean hands,
172. BERGELSON, supra note 164, at 62.
173. To reiterate, in a case where someone was coerced or duped into selling their kidney, this
rationale would not apply because the consent would not have been fully and freely given.
174. For instance, see NIRB Fact Sheet, supra note 144, at 1, which categorizes prostitution
as a crime against society instead of a crime against a person. For a discussion of why society
cannot serve as a victim in regards to which victim-facing punishment can be justified, see Section
nI.c.
175. For evidence that this is already occurring, see Julie Bindel, Organ Trafficking: A Deadly
Trade, TELEGRAPH (July 1, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
uknews/10146338/Organ-trafficking-a-deadly-trade.html [https://perma.cc/7ELD-TXVW].
176. Bergelson helpfully suggests a distinction between two groups of offenses, one in which
"the act itself does not violate a prohibitory norm," such as having sex with another person, but is
criminalized "only because of the absence of consent," and a second category of offenses, such as
murder, for which the underlying behavior is "bad per se," even if consent is given. BERGELSON,
supra note 164, at 62-63. For the former category of offenses, punishment will no longer be
warranted if consent is given, whereas justifications for punishment will persist in the latter
category even in the event the victim consents.
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which deny plaintiffs relief when they have contributed to, or otherwise
behaved unethically in relation to, the subject matter of a suit.177 In the
criminal law context, a victim might similarly have unclean hands if he
was a coconspirator in the offense, if he unreasonably provoked the
offender, or if he culpably contributed to the harm he suffered at the
offender's hands in some other way.178 In a related vein, Bergelson has
advocated for a regime of "comparative criminal liability," under which
an offender's punishment would turn on "numerous factors, such as the
magnitude of the affected rights of the perpetrator and the victim; the
respective causative roles played by the perpetrator and the victim; and
their relative culpability."1 79 In this Article, we focus on the narrower
idea that, where the direct victim of a criminal offense has unclean
hands, differential punishment will be inappropriate because the
victim-facing justifications for punishment will not apply.
To demonstrate this, let us first consider again the expressive
theories of punishment: for similar reasons as was the case with consent
crimes, a person who culpably contributes to the criminal offense
committed against him seems both to deserve less of a showing of
respect in relation to the offense than would a totally innocent victim,
and has not been demeaned by the commission of that offense to the
same extent he would have been had he not had unclean hands. Put
differently, an offender seems to make a weaker "statement" about his
own value relative to a victim's when that victim's behavior contributed
to his own suffering. Moreover, as with a "victim" who consented to the
crime perpetrated against him, a victim who is himself culpable in part
for the harm he suffers is not entitled to have his vengeance channeled
by the state. Additionally, in many cases, such victims might even
desire vengeance less, because they understand and accept the role that
they played in bringing about the harm that they have suffered.
Take, for instance, Ivan and Joe, two drivers drag racing at night
through the streets of Miami.180 When a two-lane road abruptly narrows
into one lane, Ivan's car strikes Joe's, causing Joe's car to crash into a
177. For a recent overview of these doctrines and their continued vitality in the civil law
context, see T. Leigh Anenson, Limiting Legal Remedies: An Analysis of Unclean Hands, 99 KY.
L.J. 63 (2010).
178. Andrew Nash has suggested a definition of victim that would exclude objects of criminal
offenses who consented to, or whose only criminal action caused, the crime to be committed against
them. Nash, supra note 135, at 1457. To a certain extent, such considerations are already present
in criminal sentencing: the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, for instance, provide that "[i]f the
victim's wrongful conduct contributed significantly to provoking the offense behavior, the court
may reduce the sentence below the guideline range to reflect the nature and circumstances of the
offense." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.10 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2004).
179. BERGELSON, supra note 164, at 141.
180. Bergelson draws on a similar hypothetical in illustrating her theory of comparative
criminal liability. See id. at 2, 99.
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ditch off the side of the road, killing Joe instantly. Here, Ivan's reckless
driving behavior certainly warrants scrutiny from the criminal law-
his decision to drag race down narrow roadways is highly culpable,
should be deterred, and raises questions about his need for
incapacitation and rehabilitation. Moreover, a terrible and entirely
foreseeable result (i.e., Joe's death) resulted from Ivan's behavior. But
it is much less clear that Joe deserves either a channeling of vengeance
or a showing of expressive punishment given his own culpable
contribution to his demise.
First, it seems odd to say that Joe is entitled to have the state
channel his "vengeance" against Ivan, given that Joe was driving
recklessly in the same race that Ivan was. That is, Joe may have, to a
certain extent, "assumed the risk" of harm befalling him when he
behaved as culpably as he did. Similarly, the fact that Joe and Ivan
engaged in the same behavior might render it less imperative to express
the message that society deems it unacceptable for Ivan to have
"treated" Joe the way that he did. After all, Ivan and Joe were both
equally reckless in disregarding the threat to each other's lives during
the race, and the fact that Ivan killed Joe, as opposed to the other way
around, was simply a matter of chance. In short, victim-facing
justifications for punishment do not provide any compelling reason to
impose an additional quantum of punishment against Ivan in this
scenario.
Of course, one might think that a victim's culpable behavior
might similarly reduce the offender-facing justifications for
punishment-and in some cases this may be true. However, even in
most cases where a victim acts with unclean hands, it still remains the
case that offenders have behaved wrongfully, should be deterred from
behaving in such a way in the future, and may need to be incapacitated
or rehabilitated in light of their actions. Furthermore, if a victim's
behavior was so extreme as to fully negate the offender's culpability for
her actions, the law often affords the offender an affirmative defense
(such as the familiar claim of self-defense), 181 excusing the offender from
punishment entirely. So while a victim's unclean hands may in some
cases diminish offender-facing justifications for punishment, a victim's
shared culpability for a crime committed against her much more
strongly and systematically weighs on the validity of victim-facing
justifications available for that crime. 182
181. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("Use of
Force in Self-Protection").
182. It makes sense, of course, that facts about the victim and his behavior would weigh more




A complete taxonomy of situations in which courts should find
that a victim's shared culpability for the offense committed against him
vitiates the desirability of differential punishment is beyond the scope
of this Article. Such determinations should be fact-specific inquiries
made on a case-by-case basis. But as we have demonstrated, courts
should, as a general matter, look to whether the victim's own culpability
negates the appropriateness of punishing the offender based on each of
the victim-facing justifications for punishment in determining when the
practice of differential punishment should be abandoned due to a
victim's unclean hands. 183
C. Crimes for Which the Victim Desires to Show the Offender "Mercy"
Finally, differential punishment is also unwarranted when there
is a non-consenting, non-culpable direct victim of a criminal offense, but
that victim explicitly disavows expressive and vengeance-based
punishment on her behalf. Put simply, when a victim desires to show
her offender "mercy" in this way, the victim-facing justifications for
punishment no longer serve any legitimate function. In other words, it
no longer makes sense to speak of vindicating a victim's interests
through an added measure of punishment when that victim herself has
made clear that she has no such interests to vindicate. Commentators
and scholars have long debated the proper role a victim's mercy should
play in the sentencing of criminal offenders, with suggestions ranging
from no effect whatsoever to a substantial commutation of an offender's
sentence. 184 Our Article suggests that the proper answer to this
question is that a showing of mercy on the part of a victim should
extinguish that portion of an offender's sentence that is predicated on
victim-facing justifications for punishment (i.e., that which is
attributable to differential punishment). We will demonstrate this point
by again going through the various victim-facing justifications for
punishment to see how they would apply to victims who desire mercy
for their offenders.
First, when a victim desires to show mercy to an offender, it
makes no sense to talk about "channeling that victim's desire for
183. A related issue crops up in cases that look to whether an offender commits felony murder
if a coconspirator is accidentally killed during the commission of an enumerated felony. See, e.g.,
United States v. Tham, 118 F.3d 1501, 1511 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding defendant guilty of felony
murder with respect to an accidental self-inflicted killing of a coconspirator during an arson);
People v. Ferlin, 265 P. 230 (Cal. 1928) (finding a defendant not guilty in similar circumstances).
184. See, e.g., MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 110; Stephanos Bibas, Forgiveness in Criminal
Procedure, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 329, 338 (2007); Paul H. Robinson et al., Extralegal Punishment
Factors: A Study of Forgiveness, Hardship, Good Deeds, Apology, Remorse, and Other Such
Discretionary Factors in Assessing Criminal Punishment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 737 (2012).
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vengeance," because there is no such desire. A victim's desire to show
mercy to an offender is simply incompatible with a need on the part of
the state to punish that offender as an expression of the victim's desire
for revenge. Similarly, in an instance where a victim "forgives" the
offender, there is no risk of vigilante action on the part of that victim
that the state would need to forestall through extra punishment. It may
be the case that, even when the victim "forgives" the offender, others
(such as the victim's friends and family members) may still want to take
vigilante action. However, to punish an offender based on third parties'
desire for vengeance (in direct conflict with the victim's wishes) seems
both morally dubious and repugnant to the basic values of American
criminal jurisprudence. 185 As we have alluded to earlier, it is only
statutory harm to direct victims themselves, not emotional harm or
sympathy on the part of others, that plays a role in explaining
differential punishment as a descriptive matter. 186 If it were the case
that the practice of differential punishment was meant to forestall
vigilantism by third parties vindicating their own interests, separate
from the interests of victims themselves, this feature of the criminal law
would be difficult to explain.
Some readers might intuitively think that expressive victim-
facing justifications for punishment would persist even when the victim
does not desire expressive punishment. That is, one might initially
think that it is still necessary to "show respect" to victims by punishing
offenders even when that is not what those victims themselves want.
Relatedly, one might even be concerned that a victim who forgives their
offender would be thought of as "weak" in some quarters. We argue,
however, that this is a misguided view.
The thrust of our argument is illustrated well by the 1989
murder of Judge Robert Smith Vance at his home in Mountain Brook,
Alabama. Judge Vance's killer, Walter Leroy Moody, Jr., was given the
death penalty over the protestations of Vance's widow and an
established public record showing that Judge Vance was a lifetime
opponent of capital punishment.187 While the state court that convicted
185. In other words, the criminal justice system starts to resemble mob justice at the point it
merely serves the vengeful desires of the populace writ large.
186. See supra Section II.C. Again, this is because third-party emotional harms, unlike direct
harms to victims, are not contemplated in the statutory definitions of crimes.
187. MICHAEL MELLO, DEAD WRONG: A DEATH ROW LAWYER SPEAKS OUT AGAINST CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 46 (1997) ("Robert Vance's personal opposition to capital punishment was genuine
and heartfelt. The judge's son has written that 'my father ... did not believe that the death penalty
was a proper form of punishment.' "); Judge Gives Letter Bomber Death Sentence, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
11, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/1 1/us/judge-gives-letter-bomber-death-sentence.html
[https://perma.cc/L295-RXML]. The authors would like to thank Howard Shapiro, the lead federal
prosecutor in the Moody trial, for bringing this case to our attention.
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Moody certainly had strong offender-facing reasons for punishing him,
the fact that the death penalty in Alabama is only available for murder,
and not attempted murder,188 means that only victim-facing
justifications were available to justify Moody's execution. 189 Yet it seems
morally and rationally dubious to maintain that the best way to show
respect to Judge Vance's legacy was to betray one of his most deeply
held moral principles. In essence, the Moody case illustrates how
imposing additional punishment on an offender on the victim's behalf
(but in contradiction of the victim's actual wishes) risks re-victimization
and undermines the purpose of expressive punishment. 190
This basic insight also holds when applied to other expressive
theories of punishment. Under Jean Hampton's theory, for example, the
state engages in expressive punishment in order to reinstitute equality
between offender and victim-that is, punishment "masters" the
offender "in a way that makes the relative value of victim and
wrongdoer apparent" for all to see. 191 But an offender need not actually
be punished on the victim's behalf in order for this message to be clearly
sent. A victim arguably sends an even stronger message of her mastery
over the offender (and an express refutation of her own inferiority) by
"turning the other cheek," such that the victim holds the offender's fate
in her hands, but chooses a more compassionate route by opting for
merciful treatment. 192 In fact, Hampton herself suggested that a
victim's mercy might justifiably reduce the need to punish an offender,
though she proposed no means of determining by how much.193
188. That is, all offender-facing justifications for punishing Moody would have been present
even if his attempt to kill Judge Vance had failed. Crimes Punishable by the Death Penalty, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/crimes-punishable-death-penalty (last visited
July 27, 2017) [https://perma.cc/PC7L-4V3M] (showing that Alabama only applies the death
penalty for intentional murders in conjunction with certain aggravating factors).
189. Id.
190. Another set of concerns might arise, as in Judge Vance's case, where a victim has died
and is unable to express a preference as to whether the victim-facing justifications for punishment
should apply in her case. In such instances, the default should be to presume that the victim does
desire a showing of expressive punishment and a channeling of his vengeance, as the victim-facing
justifications for punishment also apply to deceased victims. However, there might be cases where
it is appropriate for an offender to be shown mercy (and not to be punished in light of victim-facing
justifications) even when his victim is deceased. One approach would be for courts to consider
evidence of a victim's wishes made while the victim was still alive (such as preferences expressed
in the victim's will or Judge Vance's anti-capital punishment writings). Alternatively, courts could
borrow a concept from civil law and designate a successor in interest to the victim, who could be
endowed with the right to decide on the victim's behalf whether mercy should be shown to the
offender.
191. HAMPTON, supra note 47, at 141; see also MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 110, at 128
("While nobly intentioned, other means of affirming a victim's status (such as throwing a parade
in her honor) fail to erase the evidence of [the victim's] inferiority relative to the wrongdoer.").
192. See Bibas, supra note 184, at 338.
193. See also MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 110.
1550 [Vol. 70:5:1499
2017] A THEORY OF DIFFERENTIAL PUNISHMENT
Of course, as was the case with "consent crimes," it is essential
that a victim's disavowal of the victim-facing justifications only be
recognized when it is genuine and uncoerced. Otherwise, offenders
might place undue pressure on victims to "show mercy" and thereby
reduce the offender's sentence, further imperiling such victims. For
some categories of crimes (such as domestic violence), there might also
be concerns about an abusive physical or psychological relationship
between the offender and victim that would call into question the
legitimacy of the victim's showing of mercy. 194 Although a full and
adequate treatment of these concerns is beyond the scope of this Article,
courts could perhaps conduct voluntariness hearings, 195 which are
already in widespread use for other purposes in the criminal justice
system, before accepting a victim's showing of mercy.
Importantly, however, a victim's disavowal of the victim-facing
justifications for punishment will generally have no effect on the extent
of offender-facing justifications for punishing the offender. For instance,
a victim's subsequent decision to show mercy can have no "backwards-
looking" moral valence with regard to the offender's criminal action,
and thus no bearing on retributive justice. Similarly, the fact that a
victim desires neither expressive nor vengeance-based punishment
neither increases nor reduces the imperative to deter future criminal
behavior. 196 As will be further discussed in Part IV, the proper response
to a victim's showing of mercy is merely to remove that portion of an
offender's punishment attributable to differential punishment-that is,
to not punish the offender for causing the harm that the victim has
absolved him of.
As we have shown, victim-facing justifications for punishment
do not apply to all criminal offenses. In cases where criminal offenses
do not have an "object," where the victim is either consenting to or
culpable for the offense, or where the victim disavows any expressive or
vengeance-based punishment on her behalf, victim-facing justifications
do not apply, and differential punishment is thus unwarranted. In Part
IV, we will discuss how to apply the insights developed in the first three
194. Such concerns are raised in other areas of law. See, e.g., Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding
Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191 (1993).
195. See Comments, An Examination of the Right to a Voluntariness Hearing, 63 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Scl. 30 (1972).
196. This is all just to say that an ex post facto showing of mercy does not bear retroactively
on the nature of an offender's behavior.
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Parts of this Article and demonstrate the impact that these changes
would have on the American criminal justice system if implemented.
IV. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK
In Part III, we demonstrated that the victim-facing justifications
for punishment, which are the only available justifications for
differential punishment, do not apply to all criminal offenses. In this
final Part, we describe how these insights might be applied in practice.
As suggested in Part I, the approach we propose is to punish offenders
in the types of cases discussed in Part III only for criminal behavior
within their control, and not for any statutory harms that ultimately
result from their actions.
Generally, this means that in the case of "intentional crimes," a
lack of victim-facing justifications for punishment would necessitate
punishing such offenses only as severely as we would punish attempts
to commit those offenses. Similarly, in the case of non-intentional
crimes, a lack of victim-facing justifications for punishment will
necessitate punishing offenders only to the extent that they would have
been punished had the statutory harm not occurred (which might, for
example, entail punishing involuntary manslaughter as if it were
reckless endangerment). 197
As one might anticipate, our approach would have a much
greater impact on the punishment of non-intentional crimes than it
would for intentional offenses. This is because the difference in
punishment between completed intentional offenses and attempts is
usually much smaller than that between completed reckless crimes and
prohibitions against reckless behavior. 198 This result is entirely
appropriate, we argue, given that there are abundant offender-facing
justifications for punishing attempts, while there are generally far
weaker offender-facing justifications for punishing non-intentional
offenses. In other words, only victim-facing justifications for
punishment can account for the severe sentences accompanying many
non-intentional offenses, such as involuntary manslaughter, in
comparison to the much lighter punishment associated with "pure"
recklessness offenses, such as reckless endangerment.
Of course, there are a great number of factors that might work
in practice to influence an offender's sentence in any given case beyond
the occurrence of a statutory harm, such as his past criminal history,
197. For those who reject the validity of victim-facing justifications altogether, the analysis in
this Part should apply to all crimes, not just those discussed in Part III.
198. Many jurisdictions follow the Model Penal Code's approach of punishing attempts equally
as severely as completed intentional offenses.
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the specific facts of his offense, and even the psychological profile of his
sentencing judge. 199 However, in this Part, we are only concerned with
the question of differential punishment: Should offenders become
eligible for harsher punishments when their actions bring about a
statutory harm? A broader discussion of other features of criminal
sentencing is beyond the scope of this Article.
A. Intentional Offenses
In the case of intentional offenses to which victim-facing
justifications do not apply, rejecting a regime of differential punishment
would require completed offenses to be punished only as severely as are
attempts of those offenses. As a legal matter, an offender who
intentionally engages in criminal action, but who does not bring about
the statutory harm necessary for its completion, is guilty of attempting
that crime. 200 Because the added measure of punishment attributable
to the statutory harm occurring in intentional crimes that fit into one
of the categories discussed in Part III is unjustified, such crimes should
be punished as attempts rather than as completed offenses. This is not
to say, though, that such offenders should be charged with (or convicted
of) attempted crimes. Rather, we are merely suggesting that their
crimes be punished as such. This recommendation follows from our
analysis in the first three Parts of this Article, because attempts give
rise to all of the same offender-facing justifications as completed
offenses (because they can implicate identical behavior and mental
stateS201), but do not give rise to victim-facing justifications for
punishment (because no statutory harm occurs as the result of an
attempt). 202
199. Factors as esoteric as when a judge last ate can influence a defendant's precise sentence.
See I Think It's Time We Broke for Lunch..., EcONOMIST (Apr. 14, 2011),
http://www.economist.com/node/18557594 [https://perma.cc/9QPB-XEDN] (detailing how judges
more often give harsher sentences when hungry). For an overview of post-conviction sentencing
enhancements, see, for example, Michael A. Simons, Prosecutors as Punishment Theorists: Seeking
Sentencing Justice, 16 GEo. MASON L. REV. 303 (2009).
200. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
201. While attempts and completed crimes can be committed with different underlying
behavior, they do not have to be. For a given completed crime, one can generally imagine an
attempted offense with identical behavior.
202. It might be objected at this point that even inchoate offenses (such as attempts) can
implicate many of the same worries that animate victim-facing justifications for punishment.
However, this position reflects a misunderstanding about the victim-facing justifications for
punishment. These justifications justify differential punishment only when the degree of
punishment justified by offender-facing justifications is insufficient in light of the statutory harm,
either to express an appropriate level of respect to the victim or to satisfy the victim's legitimate
desire for vengeance. Yet for inchoate crimes such as attempts, there is no harm to victims above
and beyond the offender's culpable behavior that gives rise to such justifications. That is, to the
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The effect that our proposal would have on the punishment of
intentional crimes to which victim-facing justifications do not apply
varies between jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, including those that
follow the Model Penal Code, there is currently no difference in the
punishments available for attempted and completed intentional
offenses. 203 As a consequence, our proposal would not affect the
punishment of intentional crimes in those jurisdictions. In other
jurisdictions, however, completed intentional offenses are punished
more severely than are attempts. Significantly, the death penalty,
where it is available at all, is only available for completed capital
offenses, and not attempts of those offenses. 204
Whether a jurisdiction imposes differential punishment for
intentional crimes can thus be seen as reflecting an implicit judgment
on the part of lawmakers that the degree of punishment justified by
offender-facing concerns will always be sufficient to satisfy victims'
interests in their offenders' punishment. 205 In jurisdictions where there
is differential punishment in regard to intentional offenses, however,
our proposal would reduce the punishment for completed intentional
offenses to which victim-facing justifications do not apply down to the
level at which attempts are punished (and, consequently, take the death
penalty off the table in some jurisdictions).
B. Non-Intentional Offenses
As with intentional offenses, non-intentional criminal offenses
for which an offender's actions bring about a statutory harm, but with
regard to which victim-facing justifications do not apply, should be
punished as if the statutory harm did not occur. Unlike with intentional
offenses, however, virtually all jurisdictions strongly differentiate the
severity of punishment for non-intentional criminal acts depending on
whether the offender caused a statutory harm.206 Unfortunately,
determining how to punish non-intentional offenses to which victim-
facing justifications do not apply is less straightforward than was the
case with intentional offenses. Ultimately, this determination should
depend both upon the nature of the statutory harm and on whether the
extent that an attempted crime sends a disrespectful message to the victim, this message is within
the offender's control and thus weighs directly on the offender's culpability.
203. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
204. See supra notes 188-189.
205. In fact, our theory provides a possible justification for the sizable number of states that
do not follow the Model Penal Code's example and still differentiate punishment between attempts
and completed crimes.
206. For instance, involuntary manslaughter is, without exception, punishable by more severe
sentences than is reckless endangerment.
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underlying behavior giving rise to the completed offense is
independently criminalized.
First, we propose that non-intentional criminal offenses for
which the statutory harm is "serious bodily injury or death," but for
which victim-facing justifications do not apply, be punished only as
severely as is reckless endangerment. Reckless endangerment is a
crime that punishes behavior that threatens to cause serious bodily
injury or death, but which does not ultimately bring about that result.207
Thus, reckless endangerment captures the same offender-facing
justifications as result-based offenses like involuntary manslaughter,
with the only difference being that the latter offense requires the
occurrence of a statutory harm (i.e., a victim's death).208
Second, for certain non-intentional offenses, the underlying
behavior giving rise to the completed offense is independently
criminalized regardless of whether a statutory harm materializes. For
207. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (AM. LAw INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("A person
commits a misdemeanor if he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another
person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.").
208. Note that there are two possible ways to conceive of the role that "risk" plays in the crime
of reckless endangerment, each of which might have different implications for our theory.
According to the first, and in our opinion more plausible, view, whether or not an offender has
"created a risk" is a function of his behavior. That is to say that the crime of reckless endangerment
targets behavior that is itself culpably risky, as opposed to any contingent result of that behavior
that is outside of the offender's control. This view does not necessitate a regime of differential
punishment for the crime of reckless endangerment, because all elements of the offense-including
the "creation of risk"-are within the offender's control. As such, the punishment for the crime of
reckless endangerment, understood in this way, is fully explicable in terms of the various offender-
facing justifications for punishment.
If, on the other hand, "risk creation" is treated as an objective phenomenon, as opposed to a
feature of an offender's behavior, then the element of "risk creation" would seem to function as a
statutory harm beyond the offender's control. However, this interpretation would lead to a highly
implausible view about the crime of reckless endangerment and the state's goals in criminalizing
it. First, as we have argued at length in Part I, offender-facing justifications for punishment cannot
explain differentiating punishment based on results outside of an offender's control. Yet, it seems
obvious that there are strong offender-facing justifications implicated by behavior that risks life
and limb (e.g., the need to deter such behavior). Moreover, as argued in Part II, mere risk to an
individual (especially a victim who is not the intentional target of an offender's behavior) is
insufficient to implicate the various victim-facing justifications for punishment. That is, there is
no reason to think that an individual would feel particularly demeaned by or vengeful against
someone who did not cause (or even intend to cause) him harm. Furthermore, it is also unclear in
the first instance that there is any principled conceptual distinction between behavior that creates
risk and behavior that may create risk. That is, behavior that "risks creating a risk" is itself "risky"
behavior. Thus, it is more intelligible to conceive of the crime of reckless endangerment as one
prohibiting risky conduct rather than as one aimed at prohibiting the abstract "harm" of "risk
creation." Indeed, the Model Penal Code and states that follow its example explicitly endorse the
view that risk need not be created in this "abstract" sense for the crime of reckless endangerment
to have been committed. However, if despite this one nevertheless maintains that reckless
endangerment is a prohibition against "objective risk creation" rather than "risky behavior" (and
is thus only explicable in terms of victim-facing justifications for punishment), then offenders
should not be punished at all when such justifications do not pertain, however counterintuitive
this implication might be.
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these offenses, the completed offense should be punished only as
severely as would be the underlying "conduct offense" (e.g., driving
under the influence or unlawfully discharging a firearm 209). These
conduct offenses generally target behaviors that are deemed so
undesirable that the state has sufficient offender-facing justifications
to punish them even when they do not bring about harmful results.
It will sometimes be the case both that the behavior underlying
a particular offense is independently criminalized and that the
statutory harm resulting from that behavior is serious bodily injury or
death. For example, imagine that Kate shoots Lucas in a public park,
with his consent, as part of a performance art installation that Lucas is
putting on, thereby recklessly killing him.210 As a consequence, Kate is
charged with involuntary manslaughter. Because Lucas fully and freely
consented to Kate's actions, victim-facing justifications for punishment
do not apply to the resultant statutory harm of his death.211 Thus, Kate
should be sentenced only as severely as she would have been had she
committed the offenses of reckless endangerment and unlawful
discharge of a firearm. These conduct offenses reflect all of the offender-
facing justifications that apply to Kate's behavior, but because they do
not require the occurrence of a statutory harm (e.g., Lucas' death), they
persist even though, given Lucas' consent, victim-facing justifications
do not apply to Kate's offense.
There are also a number of non-intentional offenses for which
the underlying behavior is not criminalized unless it leads to a statutory
harm. Thus, when victim-facing justifications for punishment do not
apply to such offenses, there is no basis for punishing offenders for them
at all. While this may seem like an extreme application of our theory, it
is important to keep in mind that these are necessarily offenses for
which the statutory harm does not involve serious bodily injury or
death, and for which the underlying behavior is not deemed sufficiently
undesirable to be independently criminalized.
For an example of such a case, take Mary, who, while recklessly
hitting golf balls on her front lawn, slices a ball through her neighbor
Nina's window. She is soon thereafter caught by a security guard
employed by Nina, who turns Mary over to the police, leading to her
209. For example, see Arizona's Unlawful Discharge of Firearms statute. ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3107(A) (2017) ("A person who with criminal negligence discharges a firearm within or
into the limits of any municipality is guilty of a class 6 felony.").
210. This hypothetical is based on Chris Burden's art installation titled Shoot. See Natalie
Finn, Artist Chris Burden Dies at 69: Created "Urban Light" Street Lamp Installation at LACMA;
Was Shot, Nailed to a Car for His Craft, E! NEWS (May 11, 2015, 2:28 PM),
http://www.eonline.com/news/655572/artist-chris-burden-dies-at-69-created-urban-light-street-
lamp-installation-at-lacma-was-shot-nailed-to-a-car-for-his-craft [https://perma.cc/WG67-2KP3].
211. See supra Section IlI.B.
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being charged with the misdemeanor offense of "Reckless Damage or
Destruction" of another's property. 212 Upon learning of Mary's arrest
and impending prosecution, Nina expresses a desire to show mercy
towards Mary. In this instance, because victim-facing justifications for
punishing Mary no longer apply (as a result of Nina's "mercy"), there is
no longer any basis for punishing Mary. This is because Mary's
behavior-hitting golf balls with reckless disregard of the risk that one
will cause damage to another's property-is not independently
criminalized, and would thus not have given rise to criminal charges
against Mary had her golf ball not broken Nina's window in the first
place.
Finally, a special case is presented by certain regulatory
offenses, such as traffic violations, for which there is both no "object" of
the offense-it is not "done to" anyone-and no conduct offense
criminalizing the underlying behavior, but for which the underlying
behavior poses sufficient risks that it should be prohibited. 213 For this
narrow set of offenses, the failure to independently criminalize the
behavior underlying them is undoubtedly a product of the reality that
detecting such undesirable behavior in the absence of the statutory
harm occurring would be impractical. For instance, it might be
functionally impossible to know if someone was driving without regard
to whether they were breaking the speed limit if they were not, in fact,
speeding.
As a matter of pure theory, this is not a reason to engage in
differential punishment-in the possibly rare cases where we could be
certain that an offender had engaged in the underlying behavior (e.g.,
driving without regard to whether one is speeding) without causing the
statutory harm, we would have sufficient offender-facing justifications
for punishing him equally as harshly as an offender who did bring about
the statutory harm. In an ideal world, therefore, such crimes would be
redefined solely in terms of the undesirable conduct they seek to
prohibit, without regard to whether a statutory harm occurs. Until such
conduct offenses are created, however, it may be necessary to punish
offenders in these circumstances on the basis of whether a statutory
harm occurs even though no victim-facing justifications for punishment
are applicable. In light of the obvious offender-facing justifications at
play with these offenses, it would likely be unacceptable to allow them
to go unpunished entirely.
212. For an example of a jurisdiction that punishes this offense, see Reckless Damage or
Destruction, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.04(a) (West 2017), providing that "[a] person commits an
offense if, without the effective consent of the owner, he recklessly damages or destroys property
of the owner."
213. See supra Section I.A.
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Leaving this minor wrinkle aside, discarding differential
punishment for non-intentional offenses to which victim-facing
justifications do not apply would have a dramatic impact on the
punishment of such offenders. This broad impact is warranted,
however, by the fact that much of the justification for punishing non-
intentional crimes in the first place stems from resultant statutory
harms beyond offenders' control.214 Some readers might feel that the
degree of punishment recommended by our approach would not be
sufficiently severe to reflect all of the offender-facing justifications
implicated by serious non-intentional offenses. For instance, some
might find it unduly lenient to only punish Kate for the crimes of
reckless endangerment and unlawful discharge of a firearm in the
hypothetical discussed above, given the extremely irresponsible nature
of her conduct. However, even if this were the case, the proper remedy
would be to increase the penalties for the underlying conduct offenses,
not to engage in differential punishment when no victim-facing
justifications apply.
In this Part, we have laid out the basic framework for how to
apply the insights generated in Parts I through III to both intentional
and non-intentional criminal offenses. Our general proposal is that
completed offenses to which victim-facing justifications for punishment
do not apply should be punished only as severely as they would have
been had no statutory harm occurred. While it is beyond the scope of
this Article to fully delineate exactly how this methodology would apply
to every conceivable set of offenses, future scholarship should further
develop the practical application of our theory.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have offered a general theory of differential
punishment that draws a distinction between offender-facing and
victim-facing justifications for punishment. As we have demonstrated,
only the latter set of theories is capable of justifying the practice of
differential punishment. We have also identified three categories of
offenses to which victim-facing justifications do not apply, and in regard
to which all parties should agree that differential punishment is
categorically unwarranted. Perpetrators of completed criminal offenses
for which there is no "object," for which the victim consents to or shares
214. See supra Parts I, II.
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culpability for the criminal offense, or for which the victim desires to
show mercy to the offender should be punished as if their actions had
failed to bring about any statutory harms.
Applying our theory would significantly reduce the severity of
many offenders' punishments, helping to combat the problem of over-
incarceration that plagues the American criminal justice system today.
Significantly, this reduction in punishment would not come at the cost
of any of the offender-facing justifications for punishment-such as
deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, or rehabilitation-or over the
objection of innocent, aggrieved crime victims. Future work should
focus on how our theory might apply to other areas of the criminal law,
such as circumstance elements, sentencing enhancements, and the
collateral consequences of conviction.

